FORMER CLOSED CITIES IN THE SOVIET BALTIC SEA REGION / LANDSCAPE

Confronting a dissonant heritage in Estonia and Latvia

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Master Thesis in Landscape Architecture

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# Contents

Contents ...............................................................................................................................i

Acknowledgements ...........................................................................................................iii

1. Introduction. .......................................................................................................................1
   1.1. Review of the historical background. .....................................................................1
       1.1.1. The occupations in Estonia and Latvia .........................................................1
       1.1.2. The Cold War in Europe ...............................................................................1
       1.1.3. Second Soviet occupation in Estonia and Latvia vs. Cold War
              in Europe: Differences and similarities on both sides of the
              Iron Curtain ........................................................................................................4
       1.1.4. Closed cities and sites ....................................................................................5
       1.1.5. Paldiski ............................................................................................................7
       1.1.6. Sillamäe ..........................................................................................................10
       1.1.7. Skrunda-1 ......................................................................................................12

   1.2. Identification of the research problem. Non-functional landscapes ..............13

2. Review of the ideological background. .......................................................................14
   2.1. From the characteristic features to the national landscape .........................14
       2.1.1. Characteristic features in the landscape .......................................................14
       2.1.2. Landscape and identity .............................................................................14
       2.1.3. Landscape and diversity .............................................................................16
       2.1.4. Landscape and heritage .............................................................................17
       2.1.5. Landscape of heritage value and national landscape .........................18

   2.2. From the national landscape to the ideological landscape .........................19
       2.2.1. National and/or non-national landscape ....................................................19
       2.2.2. Imported landscape and occupation landscape .....................................20
       2.2.3. Ideological landscape .................................................................................22

   2.3. From the ideological landscape to the cultural landscape ....................22
       2.3.1. Soviet/Socialist landscape .........................................................................22
       2.3.2. Post-Soviet/Socialist landscape ................................................................23
       2.3.3. Cultural landscape .....................................................................................24
       2.3.4. Baltic-German landscape, Coastal Swede landscape and
              Seto landscape ............................................................................................24

   2.4. From the cultural landscape to the dissonant landscape .......................26
       2.4.1. Baltic cultural landscapes: Tsarist landscape, Old
              Believers´ landscape and Orthodox Church´s landscape ......................26
       2.4.2. Dissonant heritage and dissonant landscape ............................................27

3. Aim and research questions ..........................................................................................29

4. Methodology ..................................................................................................................30
   4.1. Methodological approach .....................................................................................31
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1. Introduction.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist ideology in Europe, some years ago, our continent has faced one of its biggest challenges after the end of World War II (hereafter, WWII). This major change left half of Europe in search of a new model. A new model for everything, from economic and political aspects to landscape issues. Estonia and Latvia in this respect, are not an exception.

1.1. Review of the historical background.

1.1.1. The occupations in Estonia and Latvia.

As it is well known, the WWII in Europe finished a bit later than the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops during the final days of April 1945. This fact had as a consequence the total and unconditional surrender of the Nazi-Germany at the beginning of May.

By that moment, Estonia, Lithuania and most of Latvia, had already remained under Soviet occupation since late November 1944, ending up almost completely with the Nazi-German occupation effective over the entire territory of the Baltic states since early September 1941. This second Soviet occupation, involved the re-establishment of the Estonian SSR, Latvian SSR and Lithuanian SSR, and their re-incorporation into the USSR. All these puppet states backed by the Soviets, were originally declared communist states in July 1940, after the first Soviet occupation of June 1940 and later annexed as Soviet Socialist Republics to the Soviet Union in August the same year. This first invasion occurred as agreed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union. By this agreement the two countries decided how to divide Finland, the Baltic states, Poland and Romania, into Nazi and Soviet "spheres of influence", foreseeing their probable "territorial and political rearrangement" (Goldman, 2012).

See in the Appendix 1, the map showing Europe in 1947, after World War II - 1939-45 and the border changes - 1938-47.

1.1.2. The Cold War in Europe.

Not the first annexation, neither the post-WWII re-incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR, were recognized by any of the WWII major Western Allies, namely United States, United Kingdom and France, after or during the war. Moreover, the 1940’s annexation was censured and considered illicit by the international community (O’Connor, 2003; Smith et al., 2002). Besides, the gradual installation of civil governments under Soviet political influence and dominated by communist parties, in the already Soviet occupied Central and East Europe (from now on, CEE), infused doubts about the true intentions of Stalin in relation to what was decided between the Allies in the wartime conferences.

During the Yalta Conference in February 1945, it was agreed that all the countries in Europe, both the liberated and the formerly aligned with the Axis, would
have the right to "create democratic institutions of their own choice", due to "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live". In a similar manner, it was also agreed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union that those states will be supported to create provisional institutions "pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections" and to "facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections" (Grenville & Wasserstein, 2001).

Soon after the WWII on the contrary, it became clear that it would not be like that, as Soviet leaders used to be inclined to comprehend safety "in terms of space" (Gaddis, 1990). Stalin, wanted to secure the Soviet western border through the establishment of a series of communist-controlled regimes, under his authority, in all the bordering European states with the Soviet Union. For the final achievement of this purpose, he believed himself justified to decide the fate of the post-war CEE. Thus, the Eastern Bloc was formed from 1944 to 1949 by the grouping of states aligned with and under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

After the Yugoslavian adoption of the non-alignment position due to the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, this influence became direct political, economic and military control, and the grouped communist countries started to be called Soviet satellite states or Soviet satellites. Thereby, the Soviet Union created economic and military alliances such as the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" (henceforth, COMECON) in 1949, and the "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance" known as the Warsaw Pact (from here on, WarPac) in 1955, with the states of the Eastern Bloc as well as with some other Socialist countries from outside of Europe. The COMECON was created in contraposition to the Western economic alliance of the "Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation" (hereinafter, OEEC) organized in 1948 and later renamed in 1961 as "Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development" (from now on, OECD); while the WarPac was formed in response to the Western military alliance of the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (hereafter, NATO) founded in 1949.

Therefore, all the above facts plus many other we have not mentioned, contributed to the beginning of a period of continued tension, mutual political distrust, military rivalry and technological competition between the Western Bloc and the Easter Bloc. During this so called Cold War (henceforth, CW), usually dated 1947-1991, no direct fight happened between the United States and the Soviet Union, although several major regional conflicts arose, as Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan..., wherein each was supporting one side. The World in general and Europe in particular were divided into two halves. The capitalist Europe of the liberal democracies under American influence in the West, and the communist Europe of the people’s democracies under Soviet direct control to the East.

As early as in 1946, the term Iron Curtain appeared for the first time in relation to the Soviet controlled CEE concept. Winston Churchill used it in his "Sinews of Peace" speech of early March 1946: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "Iron Curtain" has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or
another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow”.

The continued tension among the Western World and the Soviet Europe was peacefully conserved in Europe through the physical erection of a border depicting the Iron Curtain’s ideological concept. That way, this "symbol of the ideological and physical boundary" (Sepp, 2011) that partitioned Europe during all the CW, became useful for both of the Blocs. The capitalist countries in the world accused the Soviets of building the Iron Curtain to isolate the Soviet Union and their satellite states from the free Europe, while the Socialist states defended that the United States and its allies wanted to impede the entry of revolutionary trends into their territory, by its construction.

Whereas that Churchill, describes Vienna and Belgrade of being behind the line in 1946, not any of the two cities was finally located in the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain. First, as already mentioned, the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 left Yugoslavia out of the Soviet area of influence. Later, after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet occupation zone in Austria disappeared also. The sign of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, re-established Austria as an independent country, dismantling the four allied occupations zones. The same year, Austria became permanently neutral by its Declaration of Neutrality.

Indeed, the Iron Curtain ran after 1956 along three land border areas. The first, from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland, was that of the boundaries of Norway and Finland in relation to the Soviet Union. Has to be noticed that Porkkala was given back to Finland in 1956. The second land boundary, was formed of a series of smaller ones: starting from the Baltic Sea, the inner German frontier, the former Czechoslovak border with West Germany and Austria and the borderline between Austria and Hungary, finally ending in the non-aligned Yugoslavia. The third and last terrestrial border of the Iron Curtain in Europe, was that one of the Bulgarian limits with Greece and Turkey, from Yugoslavia to the Black Sea.

See in the Appendix 2, the map of Europe during the Cold War - 1947-91, for a detailed explanation of the Iron Curtain’s geographical change and for an accurate description of the European territorial evolution along the CW.

Although a long time has passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain, some direct consequences of its existence can still be noticed when checking a map. Current geographical facts as the membership of Kaliningrad exclave to the Russian Federation, frozen conflicts as those ones around South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria or Nagorno-Karabakh, and contemporary situations like the one we have recently seen in Crimea, could not be understood without any minimum knowledge of what happened during the CW.

See in the Appendix 3, the map showing Europe nowadays - 2014, for a fast geographical and historical overview of some of the nowadays still existing consequences of the CW.
1.1.3. Second Soviet occupation in Estonia and Latvia vs. Cold War in Europe: Differences and similarities on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Although in the western European thought the CW and the Soviet occupation of CEE are considered as two of the many consequences of the same fact, the power struggle for world supremacy between the two post-WWII superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union); for Estonia and Latvia the CW and the experienced Soviet occupation are accounted as two different kind of international relations, the former Soviet Union developed with two distinct groups of nations, along two different historical periods: CW with the West (1947-91), occupation with CEE (1940-91).

First, some clear differences between the CW and the Soviet occupation can be found, in relation to the Baltic countries. Thus, the historical period called CW is usually dated to have its beginning in 1947; while Estonia and Latvia stayed under continuous foreign rule since 1940 onwards.

Second, the CW, can be regarded as a post-war consequence inasmuch as it has like main characteristic the confrontation between the victorious ideologies of the WWII (capitalism VS. communism). On the other hand, the Soviet occupation is a prolongation in time of a single event that occurred at the beginning of the WWII. In other words, it is still part of the WWII (dictatorship VS. democracy).

Third, while the capacity of assessment between the "good" ones and the "bad" ones during the WWII, apparently did not rise doubts for the western Allies till the end of the war; there was no any "good" option among the two states fighting in the WWII’s Eastern front, from the point of view of the three times invaded Estonia and Latvia.

Figure 1: Historical timeline - 1939-1991, displaying all the previously cited points, in order to graphically show the differences between the CW and the Soviet occupation.
To better understand the third point, we must not forget that the first state that occupied Estonia and Latvia was not a country member of the Axis (Germany, Italy or Japan), but a future fellow of the Allies (the Soviet Union, in this case). Accordingly, the WWII did not end with the defeat of the enemies of the Estonian and Latvian freedom neither the CW started with any change of previous existing alliances.

As a conclusion of the differences between the CW and the Soviet occupation, it can be stated that while for the western Allies, the WWII supposed the total defeat of all their enemies and the CW the standoff with one of their former allies; it could be said that for Estonia and Latvia, the WWII did not end till 1991 (when the invader dictatorship of neutral democracies retreated), or that the CW started in 1940 (when the communism began to spread). What is totally indisputable, is that the occupations in the Baltic states lasted from 1940 to 1991, making the differentiation between WWII and CW, something of secondary importance for them.

Going back to the beginning, and looking for similarities, both the CW and the Soviet occupation could be deemed by Estonia and Latvia as part of another major objective, distinct from that fight between the two post-WWII superpowers. This important aim would be the power struggle for world supremacy between the several pre-WWII great powers (France, United Kingdom, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan). In this way, and coinciding with the above, it may make no sense to fully distinguish the Soviet occupation and the CW, due to its appraisal as two different appreciations (CW and occupation) carried out by two distinct groups of nations (West and CEE) about the unique true willing (Soviet global supremacy).

Finally, the second and last similarity that can be found is that the CW and the Soviet occupation are also related due to the misery and pain created by both of them and suffered by the Estonian and Latvian citizens, among some others, for a too long time.

1.1.4. Closed cities and sites.

The former closed cities and sites in Estonia, Latvia and by extension in all the Baltic Sea region, have their origin in the fact that this area was during more than 40 years one of the border areas between the communist countries of the Eastern Bloc and the capitalist states of the Western World.

Thereby, closed cities and sites are defined as those places developed during the CW and located at both sides of the Iron Curtain, "that were inaccessible to the public" (Closed Cities and Sites) owing to national defence reasons of geostrategic importance. Currently, there is not any clear distinction to apply, in respect to the nomenclature to use around these forbidden areas. Therefore, all the listed names below, refer to the same phenomenon: closed city; closed town; closed site; forbidden city, town and site; city, town and site of restricted access. In my case, I will use the first two terms interchangeably for big locations, reserving the third one for smaller ones. I will not use the rest of them.
Soviet closed cities are described, in turn, as the closed towns situated in Soviet administered territory, whose entry was administratively and physically limited to inhabitants of the former Soviet Union, along all the existence of this state (Closed Cities and Sites). The Soviet people allowed to visit those settlements, should be residents of those localities or non residents in possession of a special permit. This document used to give the chance to enter and stay temporarily there.

The prior specification of "in Soviet administered territory" is not casual. It is a historical fact that during a period of time consisting from the second year of the WWII (1940), until the end of the CW (1991) and with the exception of the Nazi-German occupation during the WWII (1941-1944), Estonia as well as Latvia and Lithuania suffered an illegally established Soviet occupation. In this manner, the Soviet Union exercised its government over the Baltic states, as part of its own territory for more than 50 years.

In the same way, other two closed cities existed in leased territories of the Finnish southern coast, during two different historical moments. First, Finland was obliged to lease Hanko to the Soviet Union for a period of 30 years after the Winter War (1939-1940), where they fought against each other. Later, during the Continuation War (1941-1944) where Finland had the help of the Nazi-Germany against the Soviets, Hanko was evacuated and retaken by the Finnish at the end of 1941. Only after the end of the Continuation War, Finland had again to lease another territory to the USSR, Porkkala, for a period of 50 years within a larger context of territorial cessions. At the end, the Soviet Union returned Porkkala to Finland in 1956.

Moreover, the closed cities located in the Baltic Sea area, were not only in the Soviet administered territories of Estonia, Latvia and the leased territories of Finland. Soviet closed towns could be found also in Eastern Germany, communist Poland and the Soviet Russia. The full list of settlements of this type around the Baltic Sea region is as follows:

- Hanko, in a former leased territory by the USSR in Finland.
- Porkkala, in a former leased territory by the USSR in Finland.
- Paldiski, in the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (from now on Estonian SSR), within the USSR.
- Sillamäe, in the former ESSR, within the USSR.
- Tartu, in the former ESSR, within the USSR.
- Skrunda-1, in the former Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (henceforth Latvian SSR), within the USSR.
- Irbene, in the former LSSR, within the USSR.
- Liepāja, in the former LSSR, within the USSR.
- Sosnovy Bor, in the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (hereafter Russian SFSR), within the USSR.
- Kronstadt, in the former Russian SFSR, within the USSR.
- Kaliningrad, in the former Russian SFSR, within the USSR.
- Baltiysk, in the former Russian SFSR, within the USSR.
- Borne Sulinowo, in the former Polish People’s Republic.
- Prora, in the former German Democratic Republic (from here on out GDR).
See in the Appendix 4, the map of the Soviet closed cities and sites in the Baltic Sea region - 1989

Regarding all these cities, different levels of closure existed. According to the lack of accessibility and the degree of knowledge about their existence, these localities collectively called closed cities could be classified in three distinctive groups: secret cities, totally closed cities and partially closed cities.

The first ones, were populations completely prohibited for non residents, with any kind of military and/or nuclear geostrategic value. They had as a distinctive feature, the fact of not appearing on maps. On the foregoing, these used to be considered and known in very limited spheres, as secret cities.

The following ones, were settlements also totally forbidden for non residents, that possessed major military sites, like bases, industries or infrastructures. Contrarily, these sites used to be shown in the maps and consequently were named totally closed cities.

The last ones, were places appearing on the maps, not always closed for non residents. A special license from the authorities of the town was needed in order to enter the city. Nevertheless, this permit was not always easy to get and thus, these locations tended to be labelled as partially closed cities (Closed Cities and Sites).

1.1.5. Paldiski.

Paldiski is a town and Baltic Sea port located on the Pakri Peninsula, in the north-western coast of the Republic of Estonia. Today’s municipal boundaries include the same area as the closed city of the Soviet times. In this manner, Paldiski municipality covers not only the town itself, but also the rest of Pakri Peninsula, the Pakri Islands (Suur-Pakri and Väike-Pakri) and the Pakri Bay limited by the peninsula and islands. The total surface of the township area is approximately 102 km², although only the 5% of it is covered by the urban settlement.

Paldiski was founded by Peter the Great (Peter I) as an all year round ice-free naval base and fortress of the Tsarist Russia in 1718, during the Great Northern War that lasted from 1700 to 1721. As a result of this war, the Russian Empire gained nowadays Estonia, among some other lands, from the Swedish Empire. The original Swedish settlement called Rogerwick, a small harbour with a fort, was renamed by Catherine the Great (Catherine II) in 1762 as "Балтийский Порт" (Baltiyskiy Port), meaning Baltic Port in Russian language. Thus, its current name comes from the Estonian pronunciation of the Russian name (Paldiski City Council; Laar, 1993; Saar, 1995; Saadre, 2010).

Originally, the Russian Empire´s Baltic fleet had its main naval base near St. Petersburg, more exactly in a harbour called Kronstadt on the Kotlin Island. Nevertheless, this port had always suffered from several problems implicit to its geographical location. After several searches, Peter I arrived to the conclusion of building a new main Russian naval base in Paldiski, due to three main reasons (Saadre, 2010).
First, the deep waters of the Rogerwiek/Pakri Bay (more than 40 m of maximum depth) used to freeze only in the most severe winters, not like the rest of the Russian Baltic ports that used to remain frozen for some months every year. Second, a hypothetical sea port in Paldiski, would have the advantage of being in an secluded area comparing with Tallinn or St. Petersburg, what will offer the opportunity of designing a completely new naval base without the interferences and constraints of pre-existing civil settlements. Finally, a western most harbour in the Gulf of Finland, would be very helpful to reach faster to any place around the Baltic Sea. Also, we have to take into account how in that historical moment, St. Petersburg was located at the end of a narrow water passage limited by a Swedish-held Finland to the north and a Russian-controlled Estonia to the south. This led to the logical conclusion of building a new base as close to the entrance of the passage as possible, in order to avoid any kind of naval blockade from the Swedish Empire.

During the years after 1718, a huge construction work was carried out in the place, at the expense of the lives of thousands of prisoners and serfs. Nonetheless, not any of the structures originally planned for the complex of naval fortresses was ever completed. At the moment of the abandonment of the works in 1768, only 500 metres from the projected 3,000-metres-long dam between the mainland and the islands, were already built up. In a similar way, only the moat dug surrounding the fortress designed for the peninsula was finished by that moment. The village that was designed in the shape of a regular grid with very wide streets, was granted town rights only in 1783 (Paldiski City Council; Laar, 1993; Saar, 1995; Saadre, 2010). With time, the dam disappeared under the water and the star-shaped fortress was left in ruins.

Later, Paldiski became the official name of the locality in 1933, after Estonia officially gained independence in 1920. Till that year, the name of the population used to be spelled as Baltiski in Estonian language, and Baltisch-Port in German. During the first Republic of Estonia all the Russian military activity disappeared and the trade also decayed. The sea harbour of Paldiski was no longer the entry of products that should be carried to St. Petersburg via railroad. Tranquillity flooded the town, for a while (Saar, 1995; Saadre, 2010).

According to the previously cited Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, Paldiski, along with the rest of Estonia, was to be occupied by the Soviets. And so it was in June 1940. Saar (1995) and Saadre (2010) point that by the summer of 1940, only two weeks after the declaration of the forced evacuation, all the residents of Pakri Peninsula and Island had already been forcibly moved, due to the intention of the Soviet Armed Forces of installing there a naval base. The geostrategic location of Paldiski, again, was the main reason for placing both the peninsula and island under Soviet Navy’s military jurisdiction. Thus, Paldiski was turned into a Soviet Baltic fleet’s naval base, and consequently became a closed town (Rasmussen, 2010; Sepp, 2011), just before the Soviet Union entered in the WWII due to the Nazi-Germany’s invasion of June 1941.

Soon, advancing Nazi troops of the Heer arrived to Paldiski in August 1941. Some large constructions were destroyed by the retreating Soviet soldiers, although most of the city did not suffer. The Nazi-German Armed Forces occupied the town and kept it closed during all their stay, because some destroyers of the Kriegsmarine have been located in the port. About three years later on September 20, 1944, the Wehrmacht
left Paldiski on fire before running away, due to the enemy advance. After four days, the Soviet Army got in the almost completely burnt town (Saar, 1995; Saadre, 2010).

Initially, navy soldiers and border guards were stationed on the Pakri Peninsula and Islands. Afterwards, Baltic fleet military policemen, missile units, a radar station and the headquarters were moved. Then, and after the removing of the burnt buildings, barracks for all the new military units were constructed. In the same way, the infrastructure of the harbours was made bigger. Already in Soviet times two different ports existed in Paldiski. The one to the north housed the torpedo boats, while the port located to the south was the base for the submarines. As a consequence, Paldiski became very soon, the area of Estonia with higher Soviet military presence (Saar, 1995; Saadre, 2010).

In the 1950’s, bombing ranges for the Air Forces of the WarPac and the Soviet Union were opened in the north Suur-Pakri and northwest Vääike-Pakri. Later, a training centre for the crews of the Soviet Navy submarines was built in the outskirts of Paldiski, during the second half of the 1960s (Saadre, 2010), more exactly in 1968. Additionally, another centre "under direct jurisdiction of the Navy Headquarters in Moscow" that hosted two 70 MW land-based nuclear reactors for the submarine seamen’s practical training, was located in the centre of the peninsula, also in 1968 (Paldiski City Council; Rasmussen, 2010; Saadre, 2010; Sepp, 2011). In total, the military objects in the peninsula were over 20. Only the nuclear complex covered an approximate area of 27 ha, while it had a garrison formed by more than 15,000 people (Saadre, 2010), being the biggest installation of its type in all the Soviet Union. (Rasmussen, 2010)

Thereby, the major military zone was completely isolated from the mainland in a physical way, through the erection of a barbed wire fence from Pakri Bay to Lahepere Bay, along all the area’s border. In addition, security checkpoints were also placed in all the entry roads. This situation made Paldiski to be a Soviet closed city, uninterruptedly from 1944 to 1994. Even so, considering that the first time the town suffered isolation was in 1940, it can be said that Paldiski has been a closed town for more than 50 years during three different periods: 1940-41, 1941-44 and 1944-94. Periods of time that match with the three occupation periods along which Estonia suffered so much (Paldiski City Council; Saadre, 2010).

A completely new era began in Estonia when the independence was re-gained in 1991. Not like the rest of the country, Paldiski continued to be under foreign rule for some more years, after the restoration of the Estonian national sovereignty. Finally, in 1994, the "town was ceremoniously transferred to the Estonian Republic", after the military garrison (Saadre, 2010) and the last warship of the newly established Russian Federation left on August 30, 1994. In that moment, Paldiski ceased to be a closed settlement. However, it was not long before a new military units were settled along Tallinn Highway, on the limits of the locality. On this occasion, the Scouts Single Infantry Battalion, the Kalevi Infantry Battalion and the Combat Service Support Battalion, all of them belonging to the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Estonian Defence Forces, were intended there.

Between the 24th of January 1994 and the 20th of October 1996, Paldiski was a municipal district of Keila town (Paldiski City Council; Saar, 1995), because of the low number of citizens with Estonian passport the former closed city had. According to the
census data of Statistikaamet/Statistics Estonia; in 1989 the Estonian residents in Paldiski were the 2.4% of the total population. By the year 2000, the Estonians were the 29.66% of the total, being the Russians the 52.19% and people of other nationalities the other 18.85%. In 2011, the Estonians have reached the 32.8%. This significant progressive rise in the relative percentage of the Estonians over the total inhabitants, is not solely due to an increase in the total number of Estonian citizens living in the town. Another meaningful and almost continuous decrease in the total number of residents in Paldiski during the last 25 years (Statistikaamet/Statistics Estonia), has helped decidedly to the fact. Saadre (2010) describes around 7,000 inhabitants in 1992, 5,700 in 1994 and less than 4,000 in 1997, reaching the population its lowest point, that year. Similarly, the official municipal website of the Paldiski City Council states the number of citizens in 2010, in only 4,372 people. Today, the city has slightly more than 4,000 residents, being most of them pensioners of the former Soviet Armed Forces of Russian origin, usually called as ethnic Russians.

1.1.6. Sillamäe.

Sillamäe is one of the industrial towns placed in the north-east of Estonia. It is situated in the in Ida-Viru County, at the mouth of the river Sõtke which flows into the Gulf of Finland, in the Baltic Sea coast. The first record of Sillamäe dates back to 1502 as the place where the tavern Tor Bruggen was located. For some time, the territory of the present town was part of Vaivara estate. Afterwards, it was divided and "Sillamägi", as it was called in those times, took half as its share. Sillamäe became fully independent only in 1849. At the end of the 19th century, "Sillamägi" and neighbouring Tursamäe became popular holiday resort settlements between St. Petersburg intellectuals (Sillamäe City Council), such as the well known Stravinsky, Ivan Pavlov, the medicine doctor awarded with the Nobel Prize (Rasmussen, 2010) and Tchaikovsky. Nevertheless, the industry finally arrived. Thus, an shale-oil processing plant, an electric power station and a small port were built in 1928, by an Estonian oil consortium created by Swedish investors. During the WWII, however, the plant was completely destroyed together with most of the town (Anom., 1965).

The modern history of Sillamäe as an industrial city began more or less, with the arms race consequence of the CW, during the Second Soviet occupation of Estonia. The building of the new factories started in 1946, following a decision taken in the Kremlin, Moscow (Sillamäe City Council). The reason of founding a so large complex of plants, was to process shale ore to get uranium oxide (Sillamäe City Council; Rasmussen, 2010). The processing activity was the reason to prohibit the access to the city to every non resident. Only the residents and authorized workers could enter the population (Sepp, 2011). Thereby, Sillamäe became a closed city, hosting chemical and nuclear industry, especially uranium processing, all of it part of the Soviet Union’s military program. As a consequence, the military run the town.

Since the first moment, the construction of both the industrial installations and the settlement were considered as top secret. So, Sillamäe was often omitted on the Soviet maps. Some of the code names given to the locality were Moscow 400 and Leningrad 1, as no postal address existed for Sillamäe. Thus, about 5,000 Russian political prisoners and 3,800 Baltic captives, who had earlier served in the Nazi-German army built the factory complex and the centre of the population, respectively. Additionally, WWII surviving homeless from Leningrad (nowadays Saint Petersburg)
of between 14 and 18 years old, were the first inhabitants of the town as well as the first trained workers of the factory. Along the Soviet rule, the population of the locality was almost entirely composed by ethnic Russians and the contact among the inhabitants of Sillamäe and the Estonian origin residents of the surrounding localities was nonexistent. In case of going out of the city, the citizens from Sillamäe used to go to St. Petersburg or another place in the former Russian SFSR, although it is believed that a very high percentage of the population has never got out the city. In a similar way, very few Estonians have ever been in Sillamäe (Rasmussen, 2010).

By 1950 there were already finished round 280 one-floor as well as about 70 two- and three-floor buildings, some kindergartens, a highschool, a hospital comprising a group of 12 separated constructions, two cinemas and several shops and restaurants. In the same manner, special recreational facilities for the members and leaders of the communist party, were built (Sillamäe City Council). More specifically, the nomenclature used to visit a spa located not far from the town, just until the Soviet collapse (Rasmussen, 2010).

Initially, graptolite argillite (Dictyonema "shale") was extracted in the local mines, in order to get the radioactive compound. The production depended on processing raw materials containing a quantity of uranium between 80 and 120 g/t (Sepp, 2011). Mining activity stopped in the 1950’s (Rasmussen, 2010). Later in the 1960’s, after the discovery of higher grade uranium ore in Eastern Europe, around 4 million tons of raw materials were transported from different former Socialist countries to Sillamäe (Sepp, 2011). Its geographical origin was primarily Czechoslovakia (Nosov, 1995; Rasmussen, 2010), Hungary (Nosov, 1995) as well as East Germany (Rasmussen, 2010).

At the same time, loparite, a radioactive mineral coming from Kola Peninsula, in north-western Russia, was being processed, in order to get rare earth metals like tantalum or niobium. The enrichment of the uranium was being carried out at an installation close to Moscow. The Sillamäe plant was the unique facility producing uranium oxide in all the Soviet Union in that time. Only round 15 kg of metallic uranium were produced per day. It is said, in the same way, that a part of the uranium mined in Sillamäe, was destined to some of the first nuclear bombs made by the Soviet Union in the late 1940’s. However, nothing has been finally proved. The factory arrived to have around 8,000 employees in 1985 (Sepp, 2011).

Although the numbers of the production were maintained in secret (Rasmussen, 2010), estimations made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), calculate the total production of Uranium during the years 1945-1963 in 65 tons, resulting from 240,000 tons of local low grade shale ore. Meanwhile, the IAEA calculates in 12,000 tons of uranium, the production coming from the 4.2 million tons of imported high grade ore, between 1963 and 1990 (Sepp, 2011). After stopping the processing of uranium ore in 1990, the plant concentrated its efforts on the production of rare metals (Sillamäe City Council, Rasmussen, 2010). Nowadays, its ownership is divided between some foreign enterprises, an Estonian company and the Estonian State. Still today, the big industrial area in the western part of the city is closed to any visitor (Rasmussen, 2010) unrelated to the businesses.
1.1.7. Skrunda-1.

Skrunda-1 is a ghost settlement located around 5 km north of the town of Skrunda, in the Raņķi parish of the Skrunda municipality, in central Courland, Latvia. It was built by the Soviet Armed Forces in 1964 (Embassy et al., 1999) to host the 129th independent Radio-Technical Unit (Raņķu et al., 2007) that managed two major Soviet radar facilities housed in the same place.

Thus, Skrunda-1 became the location of two Dnepr radar installations (called Hen House by the NATO) constructed in the 1960’s. A Daryal radar complex was being built since 1984 (Embassy et al., 1999), also in this site, before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, unexpectedly. Both of the barn shaped radars were one of the most important "early warning radar stations" for looking for space objects as well as for locating the hypothetical incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (from now on, ICBMs). Therefore, Skrunda-1 was of geostrategic importance for the former Soviet Union, being its radars the responsible for monitoring western Europe (Podvig, 2002). Consequently, the creation of a completely secret closed city in the middle of a sparsely populated wooded area, became necessary.

After the disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly created Republic of Latvia and Russian Federation signed on 30 April 1994, the document of the agreement "On the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radar Station During its temporary Operation and Dismantling". Hence, a permit was given to Russia to use the radar facility during about four more years, foreseeing the end of all the operations on 31 August 1998, before obligatorily dismantling the installation within eighteen months.

In a joint declaration on New Year's Day 1998, the presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania urged Boris Yeltsin (the president of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1999) to accomplish with the withdrawal of all the Russian troops from the Baltic states, as had been pledged four years earlier, in 1994.

Contrary, a further two years extension of the lease on the Dnepr radar complex at Skrunda-1 was asked by the Russian Federation to Latvia, till a new Volga radar facility that was being built close to Baranovichy, in the Republic of Belarus, became totally operational. Latvia did not agree and an inspection team of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter, OSCE), verified the radar closure on 4 September 1998 (Bloed, 1997; Rosenstiel et al., 2001).

In October 1999, "all military personnel of the Russian army stationed in Skrunda left the territory of Latvia", and finally on 21 October 1999, the Skrunda-1 radar station was fully returned to the Republic of Latvia by the sign of the "Act on conveyance-acceptance of the Skrunda RS territory conveyed to Russian Federation in temporary usage between Latvia and Russia" (Embassy et al., 1999). Anyway, Skrunda-1 radar installation had to be totally dismantled prior 29 February 2000 (Chandra, 2004). All the valuable materials of the site, were retired and transported to Russia, together with the troops of the Russian Army originally stationed in Skrunda-1, before the retreat of 1999. More than 60 dilapidated buildings remained as reminder of the existence, for more than 30 years along the CW, of a secret Soviet radar complex and a closed city, also known as Skrunda-2, in the centre of Latvia.
Not as in the case of Sillamäe, the location of Skrunda-1 was always (not only often) omitted on, and its name left off the Soviet maps. This location was so secret that it never arrived to have a proper name different from those ones given as code names. The way in which the Soviets used to decide those code names, was by referring to the secret site by the name of the nearest town, adding at the end a number, very often a 1. In this case, Skrunda-1 (Raņķu et al., 2007) and Skrunda-2 were the two most common of all the given code names. Like in Sillamäe, they were used, as postal address, too.


The necessity of this research, comes from the fact that the landscapes developed during the Soviet rule are no longer useful. These landscapes created during the occupation of Estonia and Latvia, were designed in order to accomplish a series of functions far distant from the present ones. Thus, nowadays needs are different, because the way of living of the people has also changed. Additionally, the sceneries developed during the Soviet times, had to fulfil with a representative character of a political system, the communism, that no longer exists today, in Europe.

In consequence, these landscapes originated in the Soviet occupation, have become non-functional, as they cannot be coupled to the current requirements without being reformed. This is so because most of the landscapes, in use today, were designed without foreseeing current needs. Requirements, on the other hand, completely incomprehensible and unexpected in a Soviet/Socialist society.

It is on these occasions, when a deeper research about the functional and social/cultural/political/ideological adequacy of what we perceive, should be done. As said before, present day necessities and daily life have evolved along the time. In this case, some other things must be accommodated, too
2. Review of the ideological background.

The European Landscape Convention has supposed one of the most important achievements in the field of the landscape studies of the past century. The stated main aim of the Convention "to promote landscape protection, management and planning" (Council of Europe, 2000), has helped not to only to increase the concern about our European landscapes but also to explore further than the "traditional subject boundaries" of our profession (Fry, 2001). In this survey many new areas of research have been found. Similarly, some neighbouring disciplines have also been established, beyond our already studied field.

Below, a brief literature review around some of the most contemporary research areas in relation with landscape architecture and some other neighbouring disciplines, will be carried out. This revise, will later allow us to comprehend most, if not all of the complex interactions around the way in which the former Soviet closed cities are perceived, currently, by the majority of the inhabitants in Estonia and Latvia.

2.1. From the characteristic features to the national landscape.

2.1.1. Characteristic features in the landscape.

As we have mentioned before, the final objective of the European Landscape Convention is to protect, manage and plan the European landscapes, aware that the protection of the landscape entails the preservation and upkeep of the "significant or characteristic features of a landscape". Accordingly and taking into account that the characteristic features of somewhere depend on the "action and interaction of natural and/or human factors" (Council of Europe, 2000), it make sense to conclude that: the prolonged human action in time on a place and the long timescale natural processes together with their human-nature interactions, determine those special traits in that place.

Moreover, it is not as simple. In fact, it is now when doubts arise about how long the human action has to proceed or what happens if the activity stops sometime, in order to consider or not the effects over the area.

In the same way and given that the meaning of the word landscape, corresponds to "an area, as perceived by people" (Council of Europe, 2000), it is clear that the participation of people who might decide how significant any feature of the nature is, becomes an essential event. In other words, we require of human context to deal with the landscape (Fry, 2001). Otherwise, we would be working only with geomorphologic or soil-type production processes of anthropogenic or natural origin. Hence, the study of the landscape and its singular features needs of subjective observers in addition to objective factors of different origin.

2.1.2. Landscape and identity.

In any case, the connection between landscape and people cannot be limited only to a relation based in objective interactions of humans and nature or in a natural location being subjectively perceived by a human observer. It is a universally acceptable truth
that everyone is entitled to acquire identity aspects from the landscape as well as to consider it as part of its home (Council of Europe, 2000; Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004).

Additionally, and taking into consideration that landscapes: model but at the same time are modelled by people (Golley & Bellot, 1991), influence as well as are influenced by the insight of the people (Nassauer, 1995), are a decisive element for the human identity (Paassi, 2002; Council of Europe, 2000) and at the same time "an essential component of people’s surroundings" (Council of Europe, 2000); we can deduce that there are at least two different cause-effect directions inside the human-landscape mutual influence.

Following this line of thought, Stobbelaar and Hendriks (2004) uphold that the human identity concept’s source, comes from the dichotomy among personal identity, the person, and group identity, the group. They also cite the following sentence of De Levita (1965): "To establish an identity the individual must participate in a cultural unit, must be like "some other men", in that he shares their standards, ideals and habits. He must, at the same time, be like "no other men" in that he occupies a place among them which he alone can occupy".

Stobbelaar and Hendriks (2004) explain that it is possible to transfer this inter-human identity concept to the human-landscape association. According to them, identity has forever a double relationship with oneself and with the environment, being the last a social or physical landscape. Also, they agree with the preceding idea of the existence of at least two directions or "components" into the human-landscape system: "the perception of the landscape by people" and "the influence of the landscape on people". For them, the chance to qualify and differentiate landscapes is given by one of the directions of the idea of identity, while the other component allows the already well known influence of the landscape on the human identity (Seel, 1991; Van Zoest, 1994; Hendrikx, 1999; Keulartz, 2000).

Once at this point, it is very important not to mixed the identity which is able to "be objectified, in such a way that it is more or less a scientific perception of landscape identity" (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004), called geographical identity (Van Zoest, 1994); with the definition of a natural area subjectively perceived by a human observer corresponding to the meaning of landscape (Council of Europe, 2000); and/or with the other identity "that people derive from the landscape" (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004), called existential identity (Van Zoest, 1994; Boerwinkel, 1994).

To finish with this point, remains to be said that another division concerning identity can be done, by identifying two new concepts: the personal identity and the cultural identity (Van Zoest, 1994; Keulartz, 2000). This last split underlines the contrast in what the same landscape supposes for a collective or individual (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004).
2.1.3. Landscape and diversity.

In a similar way, initially, we can argue that not existing a sole global landscape, neither a single human identity, but many individual human identities and countless singular landscapes, the concept of individuality could be an own feature of the landscape. Nothing is further from reality. The concept of collectivity or community, can perfectly be another own feature of the landscape. Therefore, both ideas of individuality and collectivity, should be an indivisible part of a more general unique feature of the landscape that includes the two former. Furthermore, that more overall feature, has to be universal enough to incorporate not only those elements that can be found in groups or in an isolated way in the landscape, but also those that may be seen in both ways.

In conclusion, only one thing can be as abstract as to cover such a big variability, in number, the diversity. A diversity that is possible to be found both in humans and landscapes. Thereby, landscape is described as a way of expressing the diversity of people’s "shared cultural and natural heritage" (Council of Europe, 2000). Thus, remains clear that landscape is a reflection of the human diversity of heritage: their different ways to collect, cultivate, graze, build... ultimately, their varied lifestyles. Likewise, once all those varied ways of live, are coded in a series of agricultural, pastoral, architectonical... traditions, those habits undoubtedly become part of the peculiarities present in the human civilizations. It is also known that, the development of "local cultures" uses to have the help of the landscape what results "a basic component of the European natural and cultural heritage, contributing to human wellbeing and consolidation of the European identity" (Council of Europe, 2000).
So, for all what has been said before, landscape promotes in a very determined way the formation and revelation of a diversity of human identities and heritages, that encoded like usages are included as cultural aspects in all the different human cultures. In this manner, it is through diversity (diversity of identity and diversity of heritage), that landscape and culture join together.

2.1.4. Landscape and heritage.

Having studied the notions of identity and diversity, in addition to the connection among landscape and culture, we only need to investigate the relation between landscape and heritage.

The concept of heritage has previously appeared and has been described as made of primary elements such as landscape (Council of Europe, 2000). But the fact is that for our line of research, it is much more interesting and useful the explanation done about how the diversity of identity and diversity of heritage link landscape and culture. How is the heritage-identity relationship? Which ones are the similarities and differences? And the major one: What is heritage? These are the questions we will try to solve, starting with the most important one.

According to some of the most influential authors dealing with it, heritage can be defined in a simple way as the "contemporary use of the past". In return, a broader meaning of heritage could include not only how the past is used nowadays but also "the attempts of a present to project aspects of itself into a imagined future" (Graham et al., 2000).

About identity, as seen above, multiple types of it has been identified. However, identity is said to be in a more general way the labelling of the natural reality’s perception with a specified significance, inasmuch as landscape identity has its origin in the "co-production" carried out between human perception and nature, since "people recognise certain units in the landscape with typical characteristics and label these units with a certain identity". Due to the changes both the humanity and the natural environment suffer, the same authors describe a bit later the concept of landscape identity as the "stable part of a landscape, also named the genius loci", adding that like that identity is able to "use the qualities from the past and present in landscape development" (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004).

Thanks to these definitions, we can already point out the first similarities and differences between heritage and identity. With regard to the similarities, both heritage and identity use attributes of the past in the present. Something completely understandable considering that all the things we have nowadays have their origin in the distant past or in the recent past, also called present. In regard to the differences, heritage tries also to make things in order to they last till the future, while nothing like that is mentioned in landscape identity. Besides, identity seems to include any kind of given meaning. At the same time, not any of the prior heritage definitions describe anything like that. But maybe other ones could do it.

For instance, in the case of the landscapes, their heritage value originates in "its natural configuration and/or from human activity" (Council of Europe, 2000). Equally, the origin of any other characteristic feature of the landscape comes too, as it is already
known, from an interaction of human and natural factors. But heritage, is something more. As "political resource", heritage assists to find the "meanings of culture and power" what as a result give it a major role around socio-political issues. This political aspect, makes heritage to be accompanied by a "bewildering array of identifications and potential conflicts, not least when heritage places and objects are involved in issues of legitimization of power structures", as we will see in upcoming chapters of this paper (Graham et al., 2000). As we can check, heritage seems to include added meanings too, making this another subjective concept.

Accordingly, the relation among heritage and identity, looks to be directed by several points: First, a common use of the past for contemporary objectives, although heritage has also the intention of prolonging those desired images of the present into the future; Second, a deeply interiorized possession of subjective acquired meanings with which to give significance, being these identifications related to culture and power in the case of the heritage (Graham et al., 2000), whereas these identities are in connection with human perception and nature in the case of the identity (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004). Third and last point, there is no doubt that both of the earlier concepts are going to affect the "socio-political function" (Graham et al., 2000), of the physical environment’s "perception by the people" and/or "influence on the people" (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004), what will play a critical role in the appearance of the national landscape.

2.1.5. Landscape of heritage value and national landscape.

Making a little review of everything so far deduced, and going back to the document of the European Landscape Convention and its original definitions, aims and general measures, it is possible to conclude that the landscapes that should be protected, managed and planned, represent the human perception of all of the own identified, sociably enjoyed, determinant, cultural and natural (Council of Europe, 2000) useful resources of the past for the present ("heritage" Graham et al., 2000) in a place.

Alike, the previous definition of heritage "emerged at the same time as the codification of nationalism into the nation-state" (Graham et al., 2000). In this process of creation of a nation-state, several aspects of the precedent situation had to be changed. In all of those cases, the concept of heritage was used to help in the task. On the one hand, a not previously existing fatherland had to be created from some other different political entities. Graham et al. (2000) write that "Nationalism, and a representation of the past designated as "national heritage", developed synchronously as the "nation" was asserted over communities defined by other spatial scales or social relationships". On the other hand, this new nation, had to be inhabited by a sole group of people, whose commonly shared "standards, ideals and habits", would make them easily recognizable and distinguishable from the rest of groups. Indeed, a new cultural community (De Levita, 1965) had to be made, through the "discovery" or creation and subsequent nurturing of a national identity" where the heritage had the function of a basic tool (Graham et al., 2000). Moreover, the national heritage was also needed for different causes. It proved indispensable for the crystallization of a national identity, by "absorbing or neutralizing potentially competing heritages of social-cultural groups or regions" and in the same way, collaborated to face other nations’ demands "upon the nation’s territory or people" and to foment own demands "upon nationals in territories elsewhere" (Graham et al., 2000).
As a result, the development and implementation of all of the activities derived from the management of the national heritage, such as cataloguing, inventoried, protection, restoration, promotion... became an institutional liability and a "near-monopoly of national governments, in most countries" (Graham et al., 2000). Subsequently those landscapes of heritage value started to be labelled as landscapes of national heritage and in a more general way, national landscapes.

2.2. From the national landscape to the ideological landscape.

2.2.1. National and/or non-national landscape.

Inevitably, different interpretations about what is a national landscape appear when dealing with it. For sure, this is so, because the national identity is also a very difficult concept to be defined.

The fact is that Graham et al. (2000) use the next text of Woolf (1996), about the concept of national identity, with the intention of giving it a more specific meaning. "National identity is an abstract concept that sums up the collective expression of a subjective, individual sense of belonging to a socio-political unit: the nation state. Nationalist rhetoric assumes not only that individuals form part of a nation (through language, blood, choice, residence or some other criterion), but that they identify with the territorial unit of the nation state". Seeking the parallels between the national identity and the national landscape, it could be said that if the national identity, groups, a collectivity of membership feelings towards a socio-political unit identified with the territorial unit of the nation-state; the national landscape should cluster an array of mental projections around a unit of natural and/or cultural heritage identified with the natural location of the nation-state. Both the national identity and landscape are, in the end, human perceptions of physical realities as territory and nature.

Anyhow, in the second half of the 19th century and for the first time in history, the concept of landscape was included into the legislation "through the creation of the United State’s national parks". Soon, it became clear that nation’s cultural and natural heritage locations, could not be successfully divided, although at the beginning, those American national parks were oriented only, towards the protection of the natural heritage. No doubt, that the unit of natural and/or cultural heritage we have earlier identified with the natural location corresponds exactly to the national heritage when dealing with national landscapes.

Schama (1995), cited by Graham et al. (2000), elaborates in this line hinting that "landscapes are culture before they are nature; constructs of the imagination projected onto wood and water and rock... But it should also be acknowledged that once a certain idea of landscape, a myth, a vision, establishes itself in an actual place, it has a peculiar way of muddling categories, of making metaphors more real than their referents; of becoming, in fact, part of the scenery". No doubt also, that this capacity of mixing ranks is inevitable linked to the mutual influence between people and landscape, we have seen while dealing with identity.
2.2.2. Imported landscape and occupation landscape.

To agree on what is and what is not a national landscape (a non-national landscape), is even more complicate when a nation-state occupy another nation-state for a time. In most of those cases, the occupying power tries to secure its control over the occupied territory (the former nation-state), by the way of the imposition of an imported landscape, equal to the national landscape of the occupying nation. The ultimate intention is to assimilate the "original" one (the former national landscape of the occupied entity), by its progressive neutralization via replacement or absorption. In case the substitution and/or melting could not definitely end the distinctive autochthonous landscape, this would be later devalued labelling it as regional landscape, due to the numerical superiority of and/or greater importance given to the imposed one. The action of classifying a landscape as regional, makes it to be part of another more general type of landscape like the national one, automatically reducing its relative importance.

Figure 3: Scheme of the importation, assimilation and devaluation processes.

Anyways, the imported landscape, whose chose, design and installation has been decided by a "foreign" power, use to be easily recognizable and distinguishable from the previously existing one. Usually, the national identity of the occupied entity rejects this landscape that comes from "abroad", leading to its classification as an occupation landscape, inside the broader category of non-national landscapes. Lastly, not all the imported landscapes have to be categorized also as occupation landscapes. The interconnection among the preceding two meanings, will be valid only if the exportation/importation has been conducted under a military or political occupation of a nation-state’s territory by a different nation-state. In conclusion, all the occupation landscapes should be incorporated into the group of the imported landscapes, but not in the opposite way. Any kind of political, economical, cultural (fashion) or social (people immigration) influence, may also be the reason for the import.
The possibility of making such distinction between the landscape that comes from "overseas" and the "indigenous" one, is explained by Stobbelaar and Hendriks (2004) via the landscape legibility concept. They define legibility, as the grade to which the landscape system "abiotic, biotic and anthropogenic factors" achieves to reflect itself in the landscape image, being the landscape image the reference image of the landscape. In other words, the landscape we would like to have, taking into account the potential attributes of the existing landscape.

According to the foregoing, "the more coherence between the system and the image, the more identity the landscape has", since a bigger number of currently existing characteristic features can be found in the desired landscape. They connect the ideas of identity and that one of "significant or characteristic feature of a landscape" (Council of Europe, 2000), showing the concept of identity, as valuable "to describe the sustainable - in the sense of long lasting - features of the landscape" (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004).

So, applying the above to our study case around national, non-national, imported and occupation landscapes, when an imported landscape is implanted anywhere, it automatically diminish the preceding coherence in the landscape legibility, by reducing the quantity of real significant elements that will match the local landscape image modelled after the standards of a national landscape, different to that one coming from "outside".

One last nuance must be made clear. When the ideology of the occupying power is based in a political ideology instead of in a national/nationalist ideology, and a premeditated, "centrally planned" and extensive deep change of the landscape aiming to fulfil an ideological objective, is carried out "by an administrative process" (Melluma,
1994), we should start talking about ideological landscapes in place of around occupation landscapes.

2.2.3. Ideological landscape.

To identify what is a political ideology and what a national/nationalist ideology is not so easy as it may seem at first. The ideologies, as everything in this world, use to be made of several smaller parts that together form a new thing, different from any of the individual component elements. Thus, a political ideology can include nationalist components and similarly a national ideology comprehend political points of view. Actually, in my opinion, all ideologies have something of political and something of national.

Nevertheless, I still believe that it is possible to differentiate the political ideologies from the national ones. This leads us to the key question. What criteria should we follow? The ideological objective of every of the ideologies is, without any doubt, the only possible answer.

On the one hand, the national/nationalistic ideologies tend to have the ideological objective of promoting their distinctive nationalism, based in the concept of the national identity and established with the help of the development and implementation of the national heritage, as we have already seen. As a consequence, this national heritage as physical expression of the commonly shared "standards, ideals and habits" (Graham et al., 2000), of the new cultural community (De Levita, 1965), must be promoted via the institutions because everything related to it became a "near-monopoly of national governments, in most countries" (Graham et al., 2000), due to its key importance for the construction of a nation-state. In this manner we can deduce, in a definitive way, that the ideological objective of a national/nationalist ideology is to institutionally promote its national heritage.

On the other hand, the political ideologies tend to promote their own ideological objectives. This way, the Marxism-Leninism, as the most clearly visible communist movement and prevailing ideology of the former Soviet Union (an example of ideological state), had as a main aim, the development of a Socialist state through the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard composed of professional revolutionaries (originally an organic part of the working class who came to Socialist consciousness as a result of the dialectic of class struggle).

In consequence, the ideological landscape results, (in such a general way that cannot be refuted), the type of landscape related to the ideological states, as the main goal of all the political ideologies is the establishment of a (ideological) state where the prior (ideological) system rules.

2.3. From the ideological landscape to the cultural landscape.

2.3.1. Soviet/Socialist landscape.

In Estonia and Latvia, two countries continuously occupied from 1940 to 1991, the landscape identified as Soviet/Socialist, is widely understood as occupation landscape by the majority of the inhabitants (with Estonian and/or Latvian nationalist
feelings) of these Baltic states (see the figure 3). As a result, this population do not find their identity in the Soviet landscape as the "involvement seems to be one of the basic conditions for the acknowledgement of landscape identity" (Pedroli et al., 2007). At any rate, being the Soviet era an indelible part of the history of Latvia (Bell et al., 2009) and Estonia, the same occur with the Soviet/Socialist landscape.

In this manner, the Soviet/Socialist landscape was comprised by rural as well as by urban landscapes. Both, were consequence of a planning decided centrally, according to pre-established targets (Melluma, 1994). Thus, and focusing on the type of landscape that will be investigated, the two main principles of the Soviet/Socialist urbanization were the egalitarianism and the planned urbanization (Andrusz, Harloe and Szelenyi, 1996). Additionally, the appearance of this type of urban planning, was based on relatively uniform and universally affordable social housing promotions allocated by state institutions, which were built in accordance to planning norms (Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic, 2006).

Thereby, first, the always historicist and usually monumental Stalinist architecture, was used between 1933 and 1955. It was called Stalinist because it was in use during the leadership of Joseph Stalin, although it received several other names. In 1955, Nikita Khrushchev condemned the excesses of Stalin through the precedent decades and ended with this style disbanding the Soviet Academy of Architecture.

Then, the rational and functional post-Stalinist architecture, was used from 1955 to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since the 1970s, more freedom was allowed to the architects. This style was designed bearing in mind the low-cost massive residential plans, in order to try to remedy the existing severe housing shortage. At the beginning, the constructions were made of brick, but later the concrete-panel technique was developed, looking for a reduction in the costs as well as in the completion time. Some of the nicknames for various of the different apartment-block models designed in the course of this era were: Khrushchyovka (officially 316 and 318 series, also known as K-7), Lithuanian project (464 series),...

The use of concrete, as building material, supposed a reduction in the construction costs due to the scarcity of steel and the necessary masonry techniques for laying bricks. Additionally, Socialist ideology adopted the concrete, also, "as a metaphor of its ideology", because the union of the small particles in the concrete, produce a new material much stronger than any of the original single components, separately (Vidal, 2012).

2.3.2. Post-Soviet/Socialist landscape.

The post-Soviet/Socialist landscapes are ideological landscapes under transformation (Sýkora & Bouzarovski, 2012). "Urban landscapes formed under Socialism are being adapted and remodelled to new conditions shaped by the political, economical and cultural transition to capitalism" (Sýkora, 2009). In this way, cities in former communist countries are not still Soviet/Socialist, neither already capitalist.

Like that, it is almost impossible to describe a type of landscape which is in process of change. We have already identified the Soviet/Socialist landscape, so we know how the original scenery looked at the beginning. Although we have not already
depicted the capitalist landscape, it would not be very complicated. The problem is that we do not know if the transformation would be total or not. In conclusion, what seems to be the most right, is to continue considering this category of landscape independent from the Soviet/Socialist or capitalist landscapes. Of course, when working with it, we must consider that its evolution is not already finished.

2.3.3. Cultural landscape.

Once we have checked the Soviet/Socialist and post-Soviet/Socialist landscapes, only the pre-Soviet/Socialist landscapes remains to be explained. While both of the already described landscapes are not only ideological but also cultural landscapes, the pre-Soviet/Socialist landscape is only cultural. The reason is very simple. Before the creation of the Socialist ideology there was no any other economical ideology, so all the pre-Soviet/Socialist ideologies were nationalistic, by definition.

In this manner, all the pre-Soviet/Socialist landscapes, are going to be, as cultural landscapes, related to diverse cultural communities (De Levita, 1965), sustained in commonly shared "standards, ideals and habits" (Graham et al., 2000). These cultural groups, meanwhile, can be rooted in ethnic, linguistic, religious or political aspects, as well as in a combination of all/some of the previous elements.

2.3.4. Baltic-German landscape, Coastal Swede landscape and Seto landscape.

It is a fact that several different cultural landscapes can be found in the geographical area of the Estonian and Latvian nation-states. Thus, apart from the majoritarian landscapes of the Estonian and Latvian cultural communities (De Levita, 1965), some other cultural sceneries exist in the region. In addition, these landscapes are intrinsically connected to the presence of people of non-Estonian or Latvian cultural origin, as the cultural landscapes need from the activity of the people to persist (Schama, 1995). In this way, each one of the cultural groups present in Estonia and Latvia has a related characteristic landscape category.

Baltic-German landscape

The Baltic-German landscape, for example, is the type of landscape related to the cultural community of the same name, composed by the population of German ethnic origin of the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea area. This area is covered today by the independent states of Estonia, Latvia and western Lithuania. In the 12th and 13th centuries, German-speaking colonist and crusaders settled (Christiansen, 1980) in the completely conquered and formally Christianized (by 1232) present-day Estonia and northern Latvia (Brundage, 1961). Soon the merchants and craftsmen became the majority of the quickly growing urban population. Meanwhile, the former crusaders and their descendants established the first rural estates. All of them, formed the social, commercial, political and cultural elite in the region for several centuries. The crusaders brought the not previously known lime burning skills, considerably changing the appearance of the country in the following centuries. Permanent and monumental stone buildings (churches and strongholds) were constructed. Later the feudalization of the land to vassals of German blood started in order to manage the conquered territory. This is how the first Baltic-German manors were established.
The massive construction of manors began in the 1760’s and lasted till World War I. Everything that has survived to this day, with a few exceptions, was built at those times. Buildings were sometimes surrounded by parks. In those cases, both the park and the complex of work buildings used to be enclosed by a fence or stone wall, including monumental gates and/or gated towers. The dryer and smithy were considered inflammable buildings and were usually situated farther. Straight avenues used to function as the access roads of the manors.

**Coastal Swede landscape**

The so called Coastal Swede landscape, on the other hand, is the landscape category grouping the urban and natural sceneries created and managed by the cultural group of the Coastal Swedes. This community also called as Estonian Swedes or Estonia-Swedes, is a Swedish-speaking linguistic minority traditionally residing in the coasts and islands of nowadays north-west Estonia. In the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, a large number of Swedish-speaking people arrived to this area, coming from what is now Sweden and Finland, often settling in lands owned by the Church.

The natural landscape of the Estonian Swedes, is characterised by coastal alvars where sparse grassland vegetation grow, dotted with copses of junipers, small lakes and thickets of reeds. These lands are mostly destined to grazing. Complementarily, the Coastal Swedes’ historical settlement pattern, had as a main feature, the fact of being assembled in compact clusters of farmsteads, with thatched roofs. The density of these clusters was generally denser than in the rest of northern Estonia.

**Seto landscape**

Moreover, the Seto landscape agglutinates the characteristic features of the action and interaction of the natural and human objective factors (see the figure 2). Like that, both the historical territory called Setomaa, as well as the distinct Seto cultural community, are represented in their correspondent landscape type. Setos are an ethnic, linguistic and religious group inhabiting the Seto region, which is actually divided between south-eastern Estonia and western Pskov Oblast in the Russian Federation, since 1944. The original Seto culture developed from Eastern and Western cultures, although regardless of these influences, the geographical position of Setomaa as a border area, enabled Seto folk to retain its original customs, characteristic of the Finno-Ugric cultures. So, their language belongs to the Finno-Ugric group and vernacular traditional folk religion is widely practiced and supported, together and/or mixed with the Orthodox Christianity that arrived in the 11th century. Burial mounds, sacrifice stones, healing springs, stone crosses and village chapels (“tsässons”), are samples of this syncretism. As they have never been manors or landlords in Setomaa, Seto farmers were never slaves or serfs. Their lands, belonged to Pechory monastery and could be cultivated in exchange for a rent (“obrok”).

The Seto farms and villages can be settled in different spatial patterns. Thus, normally, farms tend to be located away from each other in dispersed villages. Nevertheless, they can be found in cluster type villages and even in one-street villages. Contrary, there is one thing that all Seto farms have in common. This traditional characteristic is their closed-off nature, with buildings arranged around a yard (“moro”). This type of enclosed farms is indicative of a number of things about Seto history. All
kind of strangers used to trade routes and over the centuries Setomaa has been ravaged by a countless number of battles and wars. The closed nature of the farms helped ward off prying eyes and intruders. In this manner, strangers were only permitted in the yard and only sometimes in the antechamber (Sarv et al.).

2.4. From the cultural landscape to the dissonant landscape.

2.4.1. Baltic cultural landscapes: Tsarist landscape, Old Believers’ landscape and Orthodox Church’s landscape.

Baltic cultural landscapes

Some of the landscapes belonging to the same group of cultural landscapes, described in the preceding 2.3.4 chapter, are sometimes not identified as cultural, neither as characteristics of Estonia and/or Latvia. That way, at least three landscapes can be easily found in these countries, which fulfil both of the conditions above.

Thus, the Tsarist, Old Believers’ and Orthodox Church’s landscapes together with all of their distinctive aspects in the landscapes related to or easily associable to the Russian culture, are suspicious of not being part of the Estonian/Latvian cultural landscape. Due to its controversial origin, I have decided to list all the three landscapes under a shared landscape category, newly created by me, named as Baltic cultural landscapes.

Tsarist landscape

The first one would be the Tsarist landscape. This landscape category, refers to the particular culture existing during the Tsarist regime, that was in force in all the territories under control of the Russian Empire. This Tsarist culture was based mainly in that one of the Russian ethnic and cultural community (De Levita, 1965), but at the same time possessed several additional aspects not originated in the Russian culture. Thereby, this concept of the Tsarist culture assimilates features of the Tsarism, the political system that ruled both the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire from 1547 to 1917. This last political regime, had at the same time as a core element, the concept of the "dual Russia" coined by Tucker in 1972, in the opinion of the same author and widely accepted among other academics. The concept of the "dual Russia", describes the distant relation between the Russian government and society as a coercive association established among the elites and the masses. "The relation between the state and the society is seen as one between conqueror and conquered" (Tucker, 1972).

In consequence, this type of landscape include not only the effects displayed in the perceived surrounding environment (see the figure 2), by the Russian Imperial government till 1917, but also the samples of the non-governmental human activity in the landscape (Council of Europe, 2000), until that year. This way, every kind of building, public space or intervention performed in the nature, till the beginning of the Russian Revolution, is going to be deemed as Tsarist landscape.

Old Believers’ landscape

Old Believers’ landscape, meanwhile, would be the second of these Baltic cultural landscapes. Naturally, this type of landscape is related to the Old Believers’
cultural community, present not only in Estonia, Latvia and all the rest of today’s countries, that once were part of the Russian Empire, but also in distant places as United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia and Argentina, where they fled to avoid the Tsarist persecution. The establishment of the Old Believers, as distinct cultural group, dates back to 1666, when they separated from the official Russian Orthodox Church, due to the church reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon, between 1652 and 1666. Old Believers continue with liturgical practices that were used by the Russian Orthodox Church before the reform and posterior schism.

Therefore, Old Believers´ typical one-street villages, usually run parallel to any river or lake. It is so in the case, for example, of the settlements of the Old Believers along the shore of the lake Peipsi, in Estonia. Furthermore, the traditional way of settlement of the Old Believers incorporates the construction of a wooden fence enclosing the courtyard and the house, with the intention of hiding them from being seen from the street.

**Orthodox Church´s landscape**

The third and last type, would be the landscape of the Orthodox Church, taking into account the prior as the Russian Orthodox Church. The foregoing is one of the autocephalous Orthodox Catholic Churches, in communion with most of the rest of the Orthodox Catholic Churches in the world. As a result, this major religious community, exercises such a great influence on everyday life, as to cover territories not comprehended in the sphere of influence of the Russian culture. The Russian Orthodox Church currently claims its exclusive jurisdiction over the Orthodox Christians living in the former member republics of the Soviet Union, excluding Georgia and Armenia. It also exercises ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the autonomous Church of Japan and the Orthodox Christians living in the People´s Republic of China.

Consequently, this type of scenery, is going to deal with the religious constructions and spaces of the Russian Orthodox Church, as churches, chapels, shrines, cemeteries and others. It does not matter when the element was built, either with what construction technique, style or material. Obviously, not the religious objects of the Old Believers, neither those ones of the Seto people are going to be contemplated in this group. The firsts for being of a different faith and the second ones for being a clear sign of another singular culture.

**2.4.2. Dissonant heritage and dissonant landscape.**

Some authors, distinguish the "mismatch between heritage and people, in space and time" as dissonant heritage (Graham et al., 2000). This discrepancy among the "contemporary use of the past" (Graham et al., 2000) and the potential users of this past, usually is based the "parallel coexistence of multiple approaches" (Ashworth, 2011) in the way of viewing what happened in the past, from the present.

For that reason, when trying to apply this concept into the landscape issues, dissonant landscape should be defined, in my opinion, as: the disparity in the meanings of the distinct perceptions among different people, around the same space, at the same time. As a consequence, important "misunderstandings and even contradictions" may
originate, and even more if "it is as easy to identify against a place as with it" (Ashworth, 2011).

This latest statement will lead further on, to a deeper reflection on dissonant landscape, and specially to a more intense research on the reasons for so many possible approaches.
3. Aim and research questions.

The aim of the master thesis is to confront the cultural landscapes regarded like dissonant, by promoting its acceptance as integrant part of the Estonian/Latvian landscape. The acceptance of those sceneries I have grouped in two broader classifications called Baltic cultural landscapes and Soviet/Socialist landscapes, has been suggested via a process of accommodation of the perception.

The need for the inclusion of these landscapes, usually considered as not genuinely Estonian or Latvian, has been concluded after a review carried out around the historical, ideological and urban backgrounds, across three different scales, due to my intention to focus the research from the point of view of the ideological landscape perception. Therefore, I have finally research about some particular city landscapes that host strong historical and ideological meanings, in order to make the ideology the medium through which to identify useful explanatory landscape categories for the development of my thesis.

The city landscapes I have dealt with, in the search for those helpful landscape types full of history and ideology, are those ones of the three previously described former Baltic closed cities. In my opinion, these localities keep unsurpassable samples of some of the types of landscapes I have defined, and at the same time awake completely opposite feelings both in the past and nowadays among the different stakeholders.

Although the research questions I wanted to ask were broadly formulated, specific answers have been found, for each of the three case study Soviet closed cities. The settlements located in the Baltic Sea region are Paldiski and Sillamäe in Estonia and the ghost town of Skrunda-1 in Latvia.

With respect to the historical and ideological backgrounds, one of the main objectives in a European context, has been the exploration of both the historical moment and the ruling ideology of the former state, in which these localities were created. Thus, I have found out the solution to the inquiry "Why the closed cities were created?".

On the other hand, the investigation around "Why the closed cities were built in those particular places?", has included each and every of the geostrategic (historical), ideological and spatial planning (urban) reasons, that led to the final decision of isolating these different settlements from the rest of the state. Similarly, the way that isolation used to affect the interactions with the rest of the former Soviet Union and with the Eastern Bloc, has been also clarified.

About "How the closed cities used to work?" and specially " How these urban and common sceneries affected the natural self-identification with the landscape in these living environments?", the final results have showed the existence of important interfering factors that create several difficulties in the acquisition of identity aspects from the landscape. This finding has led to the necessity of facing the landscapes considered as dissonant, consequence of the previous disorder.
4. Methodology.

The methodology that has been followed in the making of this master thesis, consist in a research carried out on three different scales, bearing in mind three complementary backgrounds that has been connected through the ideology.

On the one hand, the three different scales have been the European, the regional one of the coastal area around the Baltic sea, and the local level scale of the case study settlements in Estonia and Latvia.

On the other hand, the three complementary backgrounds have been the historical, ideological and urban ones, operating the ideology as a union nexus between all of them.

![Figure 5: Scheme of the methodology of the master thesis.](image)

Furthermore, not all the backgrounds have been taken into consideration in all the different scales. While working in the European scale, for example, only the historical and ideological aspects have been taken into account. In the meantime, when dealing with the Baltic sea region and just in this case, all the interconnections between all of the three different backgrounds have been present. Ultimately, at the moment of analyzing the case study settlements, ideological and urban features have been studied solely, in relation to the closed cities of Paldiski and Sillamäe in Estonia and Skrunda-1 in Latvia.

In all the previous cases, the study of all these distinct scales and backgrounds have been complemented through the development and analysis of a series of maps,
showing in a more graphical way the most important points. The titles of the maps appear in italics in the schemes explaining methodology.

4.1. Methodological approach.

Firstly, a fast review of the historical background has been done, so as to give a context to relate all the non historical facts with its correspondent historical moments. Along this introduction, several key concepts have been also described and defined, some of them being: the different occupations the Baltic suffered, the CW in Europe, the relation between the last two, the closed cities and their connection with the occupations and CW... etc.

In accordance with the above mentioned, three maps have been made at European level, related to ideological and historical facts, explaining and showing: the geopolitical situation of all of the states of the continent after the last border changes happened in 1947, still consequence of the WWII; the geopolitical situation as well as the creation and evolution of the political and military alliances in Europe during the CW period, from 1947 to the beginning of the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, what lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; and the current geopolitical situation, together with the present political and military alliances’ status quo at 2014.

Figure 6: Scheme of the methodology in each of the three different scales.

Additionally, another map has been drawn around the Baltic sea region scale, by combining the historical, ideological and urban issues, with the aim of explaining the function, location and interactions of the Soviet closed cities, with respect to the major civil towns and sites of military character of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1989.
Thus, the first chapter as a whole, has been the answer to both of the inquiries "Why the closed cities were created?" and "Why the closed cities were built in those particular places?".

Secondly, a literature review has been carried, with the ultimate intention of developing a strong ideological background, in order to define as many types of landscapes as possible. Later, those landscapes has been identified when dealing with the closed cities in the local scale, in the chapter around urban results. The ideological review has been indispensable also, when discussing and stating my conclusion in the last two chapters. It has been kept in mind, during all the time, that the ideology and the landscapes classified according to it, have been the topic directing all the thesis.

Consequently, two maps for each of the studied cities have been created, when researching about the contemporary pattern of uses and pattern of buildings in the former Soviet closed cities. These two maps have helped in the task of cataloguing the common landscapes and the urban landscapes, respectively, through the prior identification of all the previously defined types of landscapes. It is clear, that not only the urban background, but also the ideological one, have been necessary for their development, as the central role the ideology plays in the theoretical elaboration, makes everything to be looked from its point of view. These two last series of maps have been the graphical response to "How the closed cities used to work?" and "How these urban and common sceneries affected the natural self-identification with the landscape in these living environments?" been the topic for the discussion chapter.

4.2. Closed cities as unique samples. Election and selection.

The importance of the closed towns for the study of the human perception, over post-Socialist city’s landscapes labelled with negative given meanings, is absolutely crucial. We have to consider, that these cities have not only strong adverse added meanings, but also exclusive urban and landscape characteristics, findable only there. Thus, all of the foregoing, makes the closed cities singular samples where to research.

The search about the way in which the Estonian and Latvian societies, could one day accept/assimilate/accommodate their perceptions, in order not to reject automatically any place in their countries, has been carried out in these villages with less interferences.

Equally, the closed cities and sites represent unsurpassable examples of how a locality first emerged in an oppressive atmosphere, can physically develop in a free environment, once the opportunity is given. It has occurred also, that one of the case study settlements has shown not modified features coming from the originally strictly-controlled situation.

This is so, because of the existence of two main reasons. The first, the absence of complex origins in the foundation of the settlements, due to a lack of precedent historical layers (destroyed by the war, never-existing), what has allowed easier and more accurate identifications of general characteristics common to all the landscapes of this type. The second, the total or partial foul of multiple interacting factors in the posterior evolution of the town (very little change, abandonment), that has resulted in
faster individual analysis of the influencing aspects as well as in better measurements of the subsequent alterations.

Thereby, the election of the closed cities as case study, has proved correct. Now, the selection made around the settlements remains to be explained.

From the six existing former closed cities in Estonia (Paldiski, Sillamäe and Tartu) and Latvia (Irbene, Liepāja and Skrunda-1), I have decided to work only with three of them, Paldiski, Sillamäe and Skrunda-1, due to a series of pondered reasons. Anyway, all of the chosen case studies, could work as unrivalled reference images of most of the types of landscapes defined in the ideological review.

So, Tartu, the largest city by urban area and most populated one between all the previous places, has concentrated many post-socialist capitalist developments because of its size, population and strategic geographical location (in the crossroad of the Tallinn-Moscow and Riga-St. Petersburg roads). Alike, Tartu has a rich and complex historical heritage/origin that began long before the Soviet times, making it a population not featured by or identified with the Soviet historical period. To top it, its main urban-landscape aspects are not Soviet, and to finish, its atmosphere has never been characterized by a non Estonian nationality/culture. Therefore, I have concluded it would not serve as one of the best reference samples of the closed cities.

Meanwhile, Liepāja, located in the south-western Latvian coast of the Baltic Sea, is the second biggest town taking into account both the size of the urban zone and the number of inhabitants. Its geographical situation, is not as good as that of Tartu, though the fact that it has always been the second major port of Latvia and the most important one in the western coast (out of the Gulf of Riga), has given it a main geostrategic value. In this way, several post-Soviet growths have occurred, specially around the central core and the port areas, where most of the small-scale and large-scale trade are concentrated respectively. These commercial enlargements, have definitively changed the landscape of the locality, removing in like manner most of its Soviet identity by the replacement of the built environment coming from the times of the former USSR. No pre-socialist built heritage has remained till nowadays, as the village was totally devastated during WWII. Besides, even if the percentage of ethnic nationals is fairly lower than in Tartu, the nationalization policy in Latvia (very different from that one in Estonia), has allowed to notably rise the percentage of Latvian citizens, being finally this number quite similar to the proportion of Estonian citizens in Tartu. As a consequence, Liepāja, a settlement previously strongly identified with non-Latvian cultures and nationalities during the existence of the Soviet Union, is now considered a modern multi-cultural Latvian population, not serving as a case study for a research about closed towns.

Last, Irbene, a ghost locality in the north-west of Latvia, keeps many similarities with the studied Skrunda-1. First, the two villages have had a similar size and population in the past and are deserted at the present. Second, both were neglected a little later that Latvia regained the independence, so no posterior evolution has happened. Third, no any previous settlement has ever existed in their locations before. Accordingly, it could be said that Irbene and Skrunda-1 are frozen examples of secret and forbidden places, that have conserved all their original landscape and heritage
identity, in an atmosphere where the Soviet ideology and culture of the former residents, is still present.

The table below summarizes the data on which I have based the criteria for my choice. The source of each of the figures is clearly displayed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former closed cities in Estonia</th>
<th>Former closed cities in Latvia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closed city</strong></td>
<td><strong>Paldiski</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>current % of autochthonous population</strong></td>
<td>54,05 (2011)</td>
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Figure 7: Table showing the useful information for the selection of the best samples for the case studies.

1 Statistikaamet/Statistics Estonia, official website (http://pub.stat.ee/).
   X¹a: Estonian citizenship.
2 Tartu City Council, official municipal website (http://tartu.ee/).
   X²a: Ethnic composition.
3 Liepāja City Council, official municipal website (http://varti.liepaja.lv/).
   X³a: Proportion of Latvians.
4 Irbene, (Site visit).
5 Skrunda-1, (Site visit).
6 Latvijas Statistika/Central Statistical Bureau, official website (http://data.csb.gov.lv/).
   X⁶a: Latvians by ethnicity.
   X⁶b: Latvians by citizenship.

4.3. Data collection methods.
Several different methods have been used to collect all the necessary data for the development of this master thesis. On the other hand, not the same techniques have been implemented for all the topics/places. In this manner, a list is needed to describe the various systems of picking information, applied around each of the subjects.

Thereby, when looking for historical facts around Europe and the Baltic, specialized literature over the WWII and post-WWII occupations, the CW, Estonia and Latvia has been revised in distinct libraries and digital sources. Additionally, a couple of visits to the Occupation Museums in Tallinn and Riga have been particularly useful in order to be introduced into the complex historical contexts of these two countries.

To gather historical details about closed cities, however, has not been so easy. Very few written info has been found along all the period of reviewing literature. In the case of Skrunda-1, for example, no any published document has been found. In the other two cases, Paldiski and Sillamäe, only literature related to environmental aspects has been achieved. Consequently, I tried to get information directly from the administrations. Both the Public Municipal Library of Sillamäe and the Paldiski City Council helped very kindly in this task. Nothing could be done in Skrunda-1, for being an abandoned town.

In the moment of making not only the European scale maps, but also the Baltic Sea scale map, I noticed, surprisingly, that no any detailed graphical resource was available in any of the books on history. Further, none of the maps included in any of the publications, depicted all the events of the topic the concerned map was dealing with. Because of that, it can be said without any doubt, that they were no accurate at all. Hence, only one possibility remained open. A generalized check of all of the maps showing interesting data was carried out, before drawing the needed map portraying all the desired facts.

When putting together all the literature around: landscape, identity, heritage, national issues, ideology, culture, socialism... and so forth, numerous articles, magazines, chapters, and books have been read. Most of them have been encountered in internet based scientific literature searchers like: Google Books (http://books.google.com/), Sciences Direct (http://www.sciencedirect.com/), Springer Online (www.springer.com/), Taylor and Francis Online (http://www.tandfonline.com/) and Wiley Online Library (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/). The rest, have been borrowed from: the Library of Estonian University of Life Sciences (EMÜ), the University of Tartu Library (TU), the library of the Department of Semiotics of the TU, the library of the Department of Geography of the TU and some others. Personal loans and the help of some people I have met during the making of this thesis, must be thanked also.

Finally, the site visits proved to be completely indispensable while making the maps of the closed cities in the local scale. Similarly, divers handmade sketches of the situation of the public space in these localities, have been key in their analysis. The few graphical information available via public and private internet geo-portals, has resulted non reliable and/or outdated in all of the cases. Certain digital data from the former closed cities of Liepaja (Latvia) and Tartu (Estonia) that finally have not been included into the case studies of this master thesis, was obtained through the aid of some people from the EMÜ and the RTU, in Tartu and Riga, respectively.
5. Results through the research on the urban background.

As mentioned before in the introduction, the creation of the closed cities, the CW and the way in which the WWII ended, are closely related. In the same way, all those historical events left its own consequences in the urban and common landscapes of the studied closed towns. In this manner, a cataloguing of these two existing landscapes has been carried out, in the scale of the case study settlements, in order to look not only for the aftermaths of the history but also for the traces of the ideology.

5.1 Pattern of buildings as urban landscape.

On the one hand, the pattern of the different types of building has been found. Like that, all the buildings of the three towns have been classified according to ten distinct categories, namely:

- Pre-Soviet/Socialist buildings: Tsarist times’ government buildings.
- Pre-Soviet/Socialist buildings: Tsarist times’ non-government buildings.
- Pre-Soviet/Socialist buildings: Orthodox Church’s buildings.
- Post-Soviet/Socialist buildings: Rebuilt buildings.
- No data.

As outcome, a map depicting the urban landscape has been achieved, for every of the cities.

5.1.1. Paldiski.

The most abundant type of building in Paldiski, is the post-Stalinist one, due to the many post-Stalinist buildings made of brick (the majority), and the existence of some additional post-Stalinist buildings made of concrete panel (the second biggest group). In this manner, the urban landscape of Paldiski is principally conformed by the post-Stalinist buildings.

In addition to the previous, the urban scenery is secondarily conformed by the Stalinist buildings, by several new post-Soviet/Socialist buildings, by some samples of non-governmental Tsarist times’ buildings, as well as by few examples of governmental Tsarist times’, Orthodox Church’s, rebuilt post-Soviet/Socialist and modern/functional post-Stalinist buildings.

The most surprising result is the location of each of the types of buildings. Leaving aside the post-Stalinist Soviet/Socialist ones, present in almost all Paldiski, all the rest of categories, have their own area of predominance. In this way, the Stalinist one is basically concentrated in two zones east of the north-south main street. Meanwhile, the post-Soviet/Socialist type is mostly located in the territory of the Northern Port, due to the concentration of new buildings in that place. Besides, all the
rest of the samples of post-Soviet/Socialist buildings, are placed along the north-south main road. Finally, few the pre-Soviet/Socialist ones can be found both along a narrow land strip between the port area and the town, and around the centre of the main street.

For more accurate information, see in the Appendix 5, the map showing the urban landscape of Paldiski.

5.1.2. Sillamäe.

Although two are the building categories abundant in Sillamäe, the Stalinist and the brick-made post-Stalinist types, only the first is considered as characteristic of the town. In spite of being an industrial town located in Ida-Virumaa, the north-eastern industrial region of Estonia, Sillamäe got in 1949 the "Architectural Grand Prix" price from the Council of Ministers of Estonia. It’s open green spaces and well designed urban furnishing, as well as the great architectural level of the buildings and its human scale, make Sillamäe a town of a high landscape value. Consequently, the urban landscape of Sillamäe is principally determined by its Stalinist constructions.

Additionally, the urban landscape is comprised too, by the plenty post-Stalinist buildings, made of brick (the majority), as well as by some post-Stalinist buildings made of concrete panel. Sillamäe offers an unmatched picture of the Soviet/Socialist urban landscapes from the WWII to 1991. So, distinct types of landscapes from different periods, can be found in different parts of the town. Few post-Soviet/Socialist buildings have been listed, being most of them new.

No any sample of pre-Soviet/Socialist building has been detected although Sillamäe was not originally founded by the Soviets. However, it is something understandable, because as seen in the historical review, Sillamäe was completely destroyed during the WWII.

The most interesting area, pursuant to the architectonical, town planning and urban landscape values, is the city centre without any doubt. There, most of the buildings are Stalinist, and several additional valuable elements are located, like the central square/gardens, the green boulevard leading to the seashore and the staircase overlooking the sea, connecting the two previous.

For more details, see in the Appendix 6, the map showing the urban landscape of Sillamäe.

5.1.3. Skrunda-1.

Not as in Paldiski or Sillamäe, the only existing building category in Skrunda-1, regarding the construction type, is the post-Stalinist Soviet/Socialist one. No any other type has been identified, as none pre-Soviet/Socialist, post-Soviet/Socialist or Stalinist building exist. This result is not a surprise, as does nothing more than confirm what was discovered, when researching about its historical background. Skrunda-1 was definitely, a secret closed town completely built in the post-Stalinist Soviet/Socialist times (1960’s), in a site where no any previous settlement existed, neither any posterior development occurred. This is so, because the town was abandoned after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, remaining as a non altered frozen example of Soviet/Socialist urban landscape.

For a further description of this unique sample, see in the Appendix 7, the map showing the urban landscape of Skrunda-1.

5.2 Pattern of uses as common landscape.

On the other hand, the pattern of the different types of use has been accomplished, also. That way, all the buildings of the three towns have been classified, in parallel to the urban landscape maps, in accordance to twelve separate categories, namely:

- Residential.
- Garages.
- Industrial, Military and Energy/Water/Food supply.
- Administrative.
- Commercial.
- Cultural.
- Sports.
- Educational.
- Sanitary.
- Religious
- Transport.
- No data.

As a result, a map describing the common landscape has been obtained, for every of the cities.

5.2.1. Paldiski.

The main characteristic of the common landscape in Paldiski, is to host the residential use as the most plenty one.

In addition, the common landscape is also comprised by the industrial/energy supply use, by several commercial use places, by some religious, educational and garage use locations, as well as by few samples of administrative, cultural, sports, sanitary and transport use.

The most interesting outcome, is the finding of a pattern of uses in which all the locations of the industrial use, are inside the Northern Port (except the headquarter of the company), and all the rest of the non-residential use buildings, are placed mostly along the main north-south street or in the surroundings of the central park, leaving all the rest of the space for the majority residential use.

For a higher definition, see in the Appendix 8, the map showing the common landscape of Paldiski.
5.2.2. Sillamäe.

Like in Paldiski, the most abundant type of use in Sillamäe is the residential one. As a consequence, it is a fact that the common landscape of this city is also characterized by its residential use.

In a similar way, the educational and commercial uses are widely present. Some, garage, industrial, religious and sports use buildings as well as few administrative, cultural, sanitary and transport use constructions have been also detected. All of them in a greater or lesser extent influence the common landscape of Sillamäe.

The most striking finding has been the spatial distribution of the different uses. In most of the cases, no any functional predominance exist in any area, except for the zone where most of the big shopping centres are located and for the Sillamäe Sports Centre. All the rest of the garage, commercial, cultural, educational, religious, sanitary... uses, appear almost uniformly scattered along the settlement.

For more accurate data, see in the Appendix 9, the map showing the common landscape of Sillamäe.

5.2.3. Skrunda-1.

Only in Skrunda-1, results that the most usual type of use, is that one related with the industrial, military and energy/water/food supply. The main reason, as expected, the large number of buildings hosting military functions. Additionally, like in the other two settlements, many residential use buildings have been listed. Thus, it can be said that the two more abundant types of use in Skrunda-1, are the military and the residential one. These two main uses determinate, mainly, the common landscape of the place.

Furthermore, the common landscape is partially conformed too, by the administrative and garage uses, due to their also important number and particular location. Finally, some commercial, cultural, educational and sanitary use buildings, as well as few sports and transport use buildings, have been detected. Logically, no any religious building has been found.

For a deeper description of this singular example, see in the Appendix 10, the map showing the common landscape of Skrunda
6. Discussion.

6.1. Results in context. The non self-identification with the landscape.

Once the results of the research on the maps have been achieved, it must be found out, what type of influence these urban and common landscapes have in the natural self-identification with the landscape in these three localities. One main hypothesis derives from them. The case study closed towns, have as a common characteristic, the fact of being perceived like city landscapes where the residents have difficulties to get a part of their identity from them. The above implies, that most of the inhabitants of these settlements, do not find their self-identification with most of the surrounding landscape, something that the European Landscape Convention (Council of Europe, 2000) and Stobbelaar & Hendriks (2004) stated as a human right. Thus, any kind of factor has to interfere in order to avoid the natural acquisition of identity aspects in the landscape, a process whose existence, defended by Golley & Bellot (1991), Nassauer (1995), the Council of Europe (2000), Paassi (2002) and Stobbelaar & Hendriks (2004), is widely accepted.

On the other hand, when talking about the importance of the closed cities as unique samples where to research, one of the arguments used in favour of this choice, was the presence in these populations of several negative meanings, added to the human perception of these urban environments.

Accordingly, it seems logical to look for a very probable relationship between the factors interfering the natural self-identification with a landscape and the negative meanings given to this particular landscape. Similarly, a general knowledge of all the elements taking part in this hypothetical association, would be very helpful for this search task.

So, going ahead with this argument, all the involved elements should be distinguished. This way, the different interfering factors in a landscape, the distinct negative given meanings in this landscape, the various groups of stakeholders of the closed towns’ landscape and finally, the varied types of landscape over which the previous three components interact, appear.

First of all, different interfering factors in a landscape can be found. When dealing with the ideology, some landscape shaping actions have been recognized, as the establishment of a new political/economical system, the foundation of a nation-state and the occupation of a nation-state, together with its consequent importation, assimilation/neutralization and devaluation processes (see the figure 3). All the previous aspects influencing the landscape, change the existential identity (Van Zoest, 1994; Boerwinkel, 1994) that people obtain from the landscape, clearly modify the original natural or urban area as well as condition the human subjective perception of an environment (see the figure 2). In addition and without any doubt, both the identification and perception a citizen get from a scenery, could be completely changed only because of the positive or negative human experiences she/he has had along her/his life, under a specific administrative rule or government. Must be taken into account, therefore, how the feeling of belonging to, the way of perceiving as well as the physical reality of Estonia and Latvia, have been amazingly affected by: three different
occupations, more than 50 years of communist rule, an independence process, a constant importation, replacement, and absorption of landscapes, plus all the incalculable personal stories originated in the precedent modifying facts.

Secondly, distinct negative acquired meanings in the landscapes have been identified also, but beforehand, a very important point has to be understood. The fact is that these adverse values originated in the historical and everyday interfering factors, not only play a central role in the interference which avoids the natural obtaining of human identity from the landscape, but also take part in the definition of some of the existing types of landscape of such area. After all, these untoward meanings generally awarded to the closed cities, they are nothing more than subjective feelings present in the human perception process about a surrounding environment (Council of Europe, 2000), and social criteria included in the group identity (De Levita, 1965; Stobberal & Hendriks, 2004), useful for the formation and classification of the varied types of landscape. Just like that, all these negative given values have been codified in several subjectively defined landscapes, according to the opinion each of the groups of stakeholders has around some other groups of landscapes, widely considered as objectively categorizable but subjectively perceivable. In this manner, these meanings incorporated into the feelings, have not been rated alone, as exactly the same value can be attached to more than one landscape by the same or different people. In conclusion, the added meanings have been evaluated only inside the significance that each stakeholder group gives to each of the not objectively formed landscape types.

Thirdly, and as already mentioned, some types of landscape have been established through the codification of the adverse values into subjective categories of landscapes. These meanings, originated in the personal and social interpretations that objectively recognizable landscapes generate in the distinct groups of people, may or may not coincide with those of other stakeholders. Logically, all the developed sorts of landscape utilized for any of the case study settlements, are common to all of the closed cities. Similarly, all of them, except two, have already been explained theoretically in the ideological review. At any rate, the landscapes universally accepted as totally objective, those ones understood as objectively definable but subjectively playable and the ones subjectively created have been reduced to the following list, with the aim of working with the fewest possible landscapes.

- Totally objective landscapes.
  - Stalinist landscape.
  - Post-Stalinist landscape.
  - Non-Soviet/Socialist landscape.
  - Pre-Soviet/Socialist landscape.
  - Seto landscape.
  - Baltic-German landscape.
  - Coastal-Swedish landscape.
  - Tsarist landscapes.
  - Old Believers´ landscape.
  - Orthodox Church´s landscape.

- Objectively definable but subjectively playable landscapes.
  - Soviet/Socialist landscape.
  - Estonian/Latvian landscape.
The relation between the diverse landscapes used to classify the urban environment in the research cities, will be clarified in the next chapter when looking for the implications of the results.

Finally, various groups of stakeholders exist too. As stated before, every group has labelled either one of the subjectively formed landscapes with at least one specific significance coincident or not with other groups’ opinion. So, has occurred that from only one subjectively perceivable objective landscape, three or four added meanings could have been originated, being used later to codify the respective subjectively formed landscapes. Hence, all the landscapes universally recognized as objective in the closed towns, the six subjectively playable landscapes, the five controversial landscape categories where all the potential given values has been granted, along with the already known characteristics of the current inhabitants of Paldiski and Sillamäe and former population of Skrunda-1, have been considered in order to find the number of stakeholders’ groups. At the end, only three communities have been set, namely: the residents with feelings of belonging to, and which think they are part of the current nation-states of Estonia and Latvia; the inhabitants which have not feelings of belonging, because they feel themselves not totally accepted in the independent countries of Estonia or Latvia; and those ones that would have preferred to continue living in the former Soviet Union or at least, like in the old Soviet times.

6.2. Implications of the results. A complicated interrelation.

At the moment of putting together in a scheme all the already ideologically described types of landscape, in order to establish the relation between the totally objective, subjectively created and subjectively playable objective landscapes, as well as to organize them in terms of membership to or inclusion in other more general landscapes, several additional things start to become clear. Thus, the fact is that most of the landscapes listed in the above three groups, do not create any kind of controversy among the various groups of residents. Actually, the totally objective sceneries are the ones which concentrate that unanimity, being organized in a very simple manner. The next disposal has been displayed in accordance to the potential opinion of the different stakeholders of the closed towns, not being involved my personal view, opinion that we will see, is quite different from this one.

On the one hand, the Stalinist and the post-Stalinist landscapes are recognized as part of the more general Soviet/Socialist landscapes, undoubtedly. Besides, the Seto landscape is always considered a regional landscape, while the so-called Baltic-German
and coastal-Swedish landscapes are taken as former national landscapes. Furthermore, the Tsarist, Old Believers’ and Orthodox Church’s types of landscape, have been added by myself in the so-named Baltic cultural landscape, due to their shared membership to the pre-Soviet/Socialist landscape group and the deduced common appreciations about all of them by the distinct stakeholder’s communities. In the same way, it must be said that the Seto, Baltic-German and coastal-Swedish landscapes, as well as the Estonian/Latvian landscape, are also comprehended in the pre-Soviet/Socialist landscape group. The non-Soviet/Socialist landscape, meanwhile, is a category that just join the pre and post-Soviet/Socialist landscapes, with the purpose to show opposition with regard to the Soviet/Socialist ones.

Moreover, a couple of the types of landscape grouping some of the previous totally objective sceneries, that is to say the Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural landscapes, together with the post-Soviet/Socialist landscape and the not mentioned before Estonian/Latvian landscapes, prove to be the ones which give rise to the subjectively playable objective landscapes. This is so because people can agree that a Stalinist landscape, for instance, is a subtype of the Soviet/Socialist landscape and similarly, they can disagree about how to consider the last one. In like manner, it is also clear that in spite of existing a disaccord on how to label this landscape, there is no doubt on the concept that we are talking about. The same happen with the other three landscape samples in the group. The ideological and the cultural landscapes, are listed inside the subjectively playable objective landscapes, because being two categories that incorporate so many other subtypes of scenery, cannot be objectively considered as group, for always including any of the interpretable landscapes.

Lastly, the three remaining unclassified landscapes, the national, occupation, and dissonant landscapes, plus two of the already referred, the regional and the former national landscapes, comprise the third group, that one of the subjectively created landscapes. As it is already known, these last sceneries have certain added meanings codified in their origin and cannot be described without taking into account the respective position of each of the closed cities’ stakeholders. Those meanings given by each of the population groups for each of the landscapes, do not have to be the same, neither similar, and may be even opposites. Usually, these five landscapes keep completely contrary acquired meanings.

Thereby, citizens with feelings of belonging to Estonia and Latvia, label the Estonian/Latvian landscape as national, the post-Soviet/Socialist one like national or dissonant and the Baltic cultural and Soviet/Socialist landscapes as dissonant or occupation landscape. In a similar way, the residents which have not feelings of membership, value as former national the Estonian/Latvian and Soviet/Socialist landscapes, like dissonant the Soviet/Socialist and post-Soviet/Socialist landscapes and as national the post-Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural landscapes. In last place, the people nostalgic of the times of the former Soviet Union, consider the Estonian/Latvian landscape as regional, the Baltic cultural one like former national, the Soviet/Socialist landscape as the only real national landscape and the current post-Soviet/Socialist landscape as dissonant or occupation landscape.

Consequently, the landscapes resulted from the classification and mapping of the built environment of the case study settlements, have different implications for each of the groups of inhabitants of the closed towns. At first, it seems that the carried out
valuations lack any kind of criteria. Nevertheless, a deeper research of them will demonstrate just the opposite.

![Subjectively interpretable objective landscapes](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjectively interpretable objective landscapes</th>
<th>Groups of stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>post-Soviet/Socialist</td>
<td>Estonian/Latvian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or Dissonant</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National or Dissonant</td>
<td>Former national (National)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonant or Occupation</td>
<td>Regional (National)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8: Summary table showing how each of the stakeholders’ groups of the closed cities, consider each of the subjectively interpretable objective landscapes as at least one type of subjectively created landscape.

It is widely accepted that citizens with strong feelings of belonging to Estonia or Latvia, will consider the traditional Estonian/Latvian landscape as their national type of landscape, since they will be able to find their self-identification from it. In this case and only for them, this landscape category is not going to have any bad meaning attached but it is going to contain good significances. This is so, because their national identity (see the figure 3) will be found in the "older, traditional elements of the landscape” (Bell et al., 2008), something very understandable taking into consideration that the "identity is the stable part of the landscape“ (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004). As a consequence, no any kind of interfering factor will avoid the natural acquisition of identity aspects in the landscape.

The same will occur with the Baltic cultural landscape for the people with feelings of not being accepted in the independent Estonia and Latvia and with the Soviet/Socialist landscape for the nostalgic for the Soviet times.

In the first instance, the lack of any Estonian or Latvian nationalist ideology will prevent them from contemplating the traditional Estonian/Latvian landscape as something more than a historical former national scenery. Besides, the rejection of every issue originated in the Soviet ideology, as national, by the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Baltic states, plus an absence of homesickness for the Soviet times, will make them to regard the Soviet/Socialist scenery as another historical ex-national landscape. In the event that the Soviet economic or political system had untoward given
values in their mind, the latter landscape type would be rated as dissonant landscape. It cannot be ignored, also, the fact that the Baltic cultural scenery results suitable for being deemed as national by the people which do not feel themselves as Estonian or Latvian, for two reasons. One, due to the Russian ethnic origin of most of the non-Estonian/Latvian residents living in these two countries. The other, because those landscapes included by me in the Baltic cultural landscape category (Tsarist, Old Believers´ and Orthodox Church´s landscapes) have obvious strong ties with the Russian culture.

In the second case, in relation to the people nostalgic for the existence of the Soviet Union, not only the foul of Estonian or Latvian nationalism but also their intention of devaluing the Estonian/Latvian landscape (see the figure 3) by labelling it as regional, will impede them to account the previous category as national. Additionally, the Baltic cultural landscape will be contemplated as former national. Although the Tsarist, Old Believers´ and Orthodox Church´s sceneries were developed throughout all the former Russian Empire and not only in the Baltic (a characteristic they have in common with the Soviet/Socialist landscape), these landscapes were established during the previous capitalist regime to that of the communist Soviet Union, preventing any possibility of admitting them also as national.

Figure 9: Scheme showing the arrangement between all the types of landscape (totally objective, subjectively playable objective landscapes and subjectively created landscapes) according to their membership or inclusion in other more general landscape category. The manner in which the different groups of stakeholders classify the subjectively interpretable sceneries into subjectively created ones, due to the codifying adverse acquired meanings, is also included.
Equally, the post-Soviet/Socialist landscape will be valued differently by each of the stakeholders’ groups, as said earlier several times. Both the inhabitants of the closed towns with feelings of membership to, as well as those with feelings of not acceptance in Estonia and Latvia, consider the current post-communist sceneries like national since these are one of the best examples of the present day way of living. Thus, the two groups have attachment to and find part of their self-identity in this landscape category. In the same way, this subjectively interpretable objective landscape, may be deemed like dissonant by all the population of the case study settlements due to one cause. The fact remains that this new landscape, could be able to diminish the precedent landscape coherence (Stobbelaar & Hendriks, 2004) of the urban environment, by the introduction of new non-Socialist buildings in an area where the reference image is mostly conformed by Soviet style constructions. The group of residents with feelings of nostalgia towards the Soviet times, meanwhile, would consider these post-Socialist developments as a sample of occupation landscape, because the available elements in order to influence the human identity (Seel, 1991; Van Zoest, 1994; Hendriks, 1999; Keulartz, 2000), would have a completely contrary meaning to that of their Soviet ideology.

Finally, both the Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural landscapes will be regarded as dissonant or occupation landscapes by the citizens with Estonian/Latvian feelings, due to their automatic rejection of these landscapes. Thereby, this repudiation of some cultural landscapes and its consideration as dissonant landscapes, comes at least partially, from the subconscious decision of not trying to get any kind of self-identification, from any landscape that could have implied any Soviet/Socialist of Russian origin. This fact, as a consequence, leaves several types of sceneries sentenced to never be accepted as national. Thus, the only existing cultural landscapes (apart of the contemporaneous post-Soviet/Socialist one), non-accepted as national landscape, would be the Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural sceneries, because all the rest of landscapes regarded as regional and former national, are national too by definition (see the figures 8 and 9).

6.3. The future challenge. Cultural landscapes considered as dissonant landscapes.

It is something already proved, that the only existing cultural landscapes non-accepted in any way as national (with the exception of the contemporary post-Socialist landscape), are the same sceneries that the citizens self-identified as Estonian/Latvian automatically reject as national, due to their consideration as dissonant landscapes. This creates a very disturbing situation, as the bigger part of the population in this two Baltic states have Estonian or Latvian national feelings. Furthermore, the most common category of landscape present in the three researched case studies, was the Soviet/Socialist one, logic consequence, moreover, of more than 40 years of Soviet government. Therefore, and supposing that the results of the case studies can be extrapolated to the two countries, we face the challenge of having the most abundant type of landscape of Estonia and Latvia, regarded as dissonant, by the bigger part of the population of these states.

In this manner, the doubt of what to do and how to deal with these cultural landscapes seen as dissonant landscapes, in relation to the implementation of one of the general measures proposed in the document of the European Landscape Convention
is paramount. In a more specific way, how to carry out this suggested action in the context of landscapes developed mostly during the so-called Soviet occupation (Nollendorfs et al., 2008) of Estonia and Latvia (Bell et al., 2009), is certainly complicated. Hence, to institutionally recognize landscapes as "essential component of people’s surroundings, an expression of the diversity of their shared cultural and natural heritage, and a foundation of their identity" is at least, extremely difficult, if not impossible, taking into account the majority rejection to the most usual landscapes.

6.4. Suggestion. The need to accommodate the perception.

As a result of the precedent challenge, and taking into account not only the fact that some major cultural landscapes are deemed as dissonant, but also the evolution (one interfering factor) that most of the landscapes in Estonia and Latvia have had since the independence was regained (another interfering factor); I have arrived to the point of proposing an accommodation of the perception, instead of a further adaptation of the already partially renovated landscapes. In this way, in my opinion, is the perception and not the landscape what has to be accommodated on some special occasions.

According to my experience, the rejection of certain landscapes in Estonia and Latvia, is guided by the automatic subjective decision (subconsciously based in a negative added meaning) of not accepting any Soviet/Socialist or Russian origin, in the neighbouring environment from which individual and collective self-identification could be found (Council of Europe, 2000; Stobelaar & Hendriks, 2004). Thereby, the natural acquisition of identity aspects in some particular landscapes (Golley & Bellot, 1991; Nassauer, 1995; Council of Europe, 2000; Paassi, 2002; Stobelaar & Hendriks, 2004), such as the Soviet/Socialist (Stalinist and post-Stalinist landscapes) and Baltic cultural landscapes (Tsarist, Old Believers’ and Orthodox Church’s landscapes), is avoided through their cataloguing as occupation, imported or non-national landscape, in accordance with the figures 3 and 4, or directly as occupation landscape, in obedience to what is expressed in the figure 9, due to the Soviet occupation (main interfering factor) the Baltic states suffered.

Nonetheless, something has surprised me even more. The manner how the repudiation of the landscapes is selectively carried out. Estonia and Latvia have endured many different occupations throughout their history and therefore, several ancient types of landscapes were imported by the occupant nations. Peculiarly, none of those originally non-national landscapes has been turned down. Even more, two of the most clear examples of those former foreign sceneries, have not only been admitted as national landscapes, but have also been institutionalized as especially valuable samples of the national heritage, namely the Baltic-German and coastal-Swedish landscapes.

To sum up, the system according to which the landscapes are rated in relation to their national adequacy must be changed and consequently, the way of perceiving the cultural landscapes labelled as dissonant, accommodated. Solely in this way, the Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural landscapes would be easily acceptable as national landscape by the people with strong Estonian or Latvian national feelings.
7. Conclusion.

Along the thesis, it has proved that the closed cities and sites were created during the CW, due to national defence reasons of geostrategic importance, when looking for the answer to the question "Why the closed cities were created".

Thereby, this period of confrontation between the victorious ideologies of the WWII, the communist Eastern Block against the capitalist Western World, led to an arms race. As a consequence, a series of locations were made inaccessible to the ordinary public, in order to keep in secret some military bases, industries and installations in the Soviet administered and/or occupied territory.

Thus, in relation to "Why the closed cities were built in those particular places?", different responses exist for each of the places.

Paldiski seaport, for example, is located on the shore of the easternmost bay of the Gulf of Finland, which remains ice-free all year around, in the Baltic north-west coast of Estonia. In addition to a port for Soviet nuclear submarines, a training centre for submarine crew members that included two training nuclear reactors was built here. This was the biggest installation of this type in all the Soviet Union and the main reason to create a single closed area including the town, both of the seaports, the nuclear installation and all the rest of military objects of the peninsula, in the zone.

Sillamäe industrial town, meanwhile, is placed at the mouth of the river Sõrke which flows into the Gulf of Finland, in the Baltic north-east coast of Estonia. Hence, it became a closed city hosting chemical and nuclear industry, especially a uranium processing complex, due to its seaport and proximity to the mines where the shale ore used to be mined originally, in order to get uranium oxide. Once higher grade uranium ore started to be imported from different Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the already existing processing activity was the reason to maintain the prohibition to access Sillamäe, to every non resident.

Moreover, Skrunda-1 settlement, hosted two major Soviet radar facilities responsible for monitoring western Europe, in search of space objects and hypothetical incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Therefore, its location not far from the west end of the Soviet Union, was of geostrategic importance for correct operation of this early warning radar station. Consequently, the creation of a completely secret closed city, in the middle of a sparsely populated wooded area, became necessary.

Later, "How the closed cities used to work?" and more specifically "How these urban and common sceneries affected the natural self-identification with the landscape in these living environments?" has been clarified.

In this manner, when the results of the landscape cataloguing developed on the scale of the three case studies, have been put into context, the existence of important interfering factors complicating the natural acquisition of identity aspects from the landscape, has been found. In this way, a deeper research about the functional and social/cultural/political/ideological adequacy of what is hypothetically perceived, by several stakeholder groups in these localities, has been carried out. As a result, five new types of landscape have been established through the codification of the negative added
meanings into subjectively created categories of landscapes. Later the implication of the results has been interpreted according to the previous landscapes and stakeholders and all this has led to the challenge of confronting the problem of the cultural landscapes regarded as dissonant. Finally, a personal suggestion has been made. The acceptance of the Soviet/Socialist and Baltic cultural landscapes, as integrant part of the Estonian/Latvian landscape, has been promoted, via a process of accommodation of the perception, rather than through a further adaptation of the already partially reformed landscapes.

This suggestion has been made, only after taking into account that the execution of landscape policies following the general principles, strategies and guidelines expressed in the European Landscape Convention’s document (2000), when dealing with cultural landscapes present in Estonia and Latvia, would need a prior acceptance of some "minority" landscapes (Tsarist, Old Believers’, Orthodox Church’s, Stalinist and post-Stalinist landscapes), as constituent part of the wider and more general category of the national landscapes.

In the end, as Palmer reminds, the perception of a landscape can be predisposed by the shared cultural qualities, of each of the different cultural groups living in a territory, in one or another direction (Ashworth, 2011). Additionally, Bell et al., (2009) point that the Soviet era is an undeniable part of the Latvian cultural and landscape history, as it is also in Estonia. Thence, it would not make sense to try to forget a historical/cultural period from the collective subconscious. Furthermore, in case of starting a process of filtration in order to arrive to the "purest" of the Estonian/Latvian landscapes, so stunning landscapes such as those of the Old Believers´ one-street villages, Baltic-German manors, Coastal Swedes´ fishermen villages and even the characteristic farms of Setomaa, could remain out.
Summary

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, half of Europe, including Estonia and Latvia, has been in search of a new reference image for the landscape. This necessity comes from the fact that the landscapes developed during the Cold War are no longer useful. These sceneries created during the Soviet Occupation in Estonia and Latvia, were designed in order to fulfil a series of functions far distant from the present ones.

This already complicated situation, may be even more complex when some of the currently existing landscapes are considered as dissonant by any of the different stakeholder groups. This occurs due to the negative added meanings interfering in the natural acquisition of identity aspects from the landscape. It is on these occasions, when a deeper research about the functional and social/cultural/political/ideological adequacy of what we perceive, should be done.

Thus, after a review carried out around the historical, ideological and urban backgrounds of the landscape perception, on three different scales, the landscape of three former closed cities, Paldiski, Sillamäe and Skrunda-1, has been studied. For this, the ideology has functioned like the medium through which some characteristic landscape categories necessary for the development of my thesis, have been identified.

For all the above, the aim of my master thesis is to confront the cultural landscapes regarded like dissonant by promoting its acceptance as integrant part of the Estonian/Latvian landscape. The acceptance of those Baltic cultural landscapes and Soviet/Socialist landscapes, has been suggested via a process of accommodation of the perception rather than through an adaptation of the landscape.
Kokkuvõte (kindly translated by Karin Ojasoo)

Nõukogude Liidu kokku varisemist saati on pool Euroopat, kaasaarvatud Eesti ja Läti, otsinud uut näidis pilti maastikust. See vajadus tuleneb asjaolust, et maastikud, mis arenesid Külma sõja perioodil, ei ole enam aksepteeritud. Need vaated, mis loodi Nõukogude okupatsiooni ajal Eestis ja Lätis, loodi tätima mitmeid funktsioone, mis ei kattu enam praeguste funktsioonidega.

See on juba keeruline olukord ning veelgi keerulisem on olukord, kus erinevad huvirühmad peavad mõnda praegu olemasolevat maastikku vastuoluliseks. See on põhjustatud negatiivsetest tähendustest, mis segavad loomuliku maastiku identiteedi aspekti. Selles olukorras tuleb läbi viia ülevaade funktsionaalsetest ja sotsiaalsetest/kultuuri/ideoloogilistest piisavusest, mida me tajume.

Peale ülevaadet maastikutaju ajaloolisest, ideoloogilisest ja urbanistika taustast kolmel erineval tasandil, uuriti põhjalikult kolme endise suletud linna - Paldiski, Sillamäe ja Skrunda-1 - maastikku. Uurimistöö hõlmab ideoloogia olnud nagu kanal, mille kaudu on leitud mõned maastiku kategooria iseloomulikud jooned, mis on vajalik edasise argumentide väljatöötamisel.

Kokku võttes eespool öeldut, magistritöö eesmärgiks on vastandada kultuurmaasikke, mida käsitletakse nagu midagi väga vastuolulist, edendades nende aksepteerimist Eesti/Läti maastiku lahatamatu osana. Nende Balti kultuurmaastike ja Nõukogude/Sotsialistlike maastike aksepteerimine on soovitatud omaks võtta pigem läbi inimese tajumise mitte läbi maastiku kohandamise protsessi.
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Appendixes.

Appendix 2. Europe during the Cold War - 1947-91.
Appendix 4. Soviet Closed Cities and Sites in the Baltic Sea Area.
Appendix 5. Urban landscape of Paldiski.
Appendix 6. Urban landscape of Sillamäe.
Appendix 7. Urban landscape of Skrunda-1.